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Small developing states can use proper regulatory frameworks in policy and sector 
development to implement efficiency and consumer safeguards to the sector. However, 
sufficient research on the impact of telecommunications regulatory institutions on micro 
economies has not been conducted.  Capture theory was used as the theoretical lens for 
this thesis.  In doing so, a quantitative analysis was done using, cross-sectional pooled 
time series to determine how an independent telecommunications regulator impacted the 
telecommunications sector in the English-speaking Caribbean. All the data acquired for 
analysis were secondary yearly data collected from the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) from 1993 to 2012. Specifically, this study examined how prices, 
investment, infrastructure, and competition in the telecoms sector are affected by the type 
of regulatory regime (independent or non independent ) for fixed line and mobile 
services. Results indicate that the type of regulatory regime has a statistically significant 
impact on fixed line services and price of the telecommunications sector (p < .0001). 
However, this regulation was absent in other areas such as cellular services, broadband 
usage, telecoms investment and competition. The potential for positive social change is 
tied to recommendations specific to developing countries to ensure their regulators have 
autonomy in making decisions regarding the volume, quality and costs of 
telecommunications services.  Legislation must minimize any overlap in the roles of 
policy makers, legislators, administrators and regulators to ensure that the regulatory 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
All modern economies are based on the backbone of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs), which is sometimes used interchangeably with the 
term telecommunications. For developing countries, there is a link between economic 
growth and living standards and the use of ICTs by those countries (Garbacz & 
Thompson, 2007). To optimize the benefits of using ICTs, the World Bank and other 
similar institutions have advocated that ICTs should be regulated. The International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU, 2014) stated, “[e]ffective regulation has proven to 
result in greater economic growth, increased investment, lower prices, better quality of 
service, higher penetration, and more rapid technological innovation in the sector” (p. 
6.2.4). However, effective regulation means having an institution or a body that is not 
only independent of the sector it regulates, but is also independent of policy creation 
(Intven, Oliver, & Sepulveda, 2000). In this quantitative study, I examined the effects of 
the two types of telecommunications regulatory frameworks: those that are independent 
from policy creation and policy creators and those that are not. I examined the 
significance of these regulatory frameworks on economic growth by using a pooled, 
cross-sectional time series analysis. 
Background 
The Caribbean is an archipelago of islands south of the North American 
continent. Its history and cultural identity are more closely related to the Europeans who 
exerted control during the colonial period than to the North Americans who live in close 
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proximity to it. The type of regulatory framework that is created in these countries stands 
in contrast to North American regulatory institutions. Daintith indicated that both a 
“cultural and constitutional context” is important to explain the difference in regulatory 
frameworks (as cited in Ogus, 2002, p. 2). In addition, British jurisprudence is different 
from U.S. jurisprudence (White, 1976). The U.S. experience, which included the 
American Revolution, resulted in beliefs that “the law and legal institutions that were 
unique rather than derivative” (Ogus, 2002, p. 1212). The countries and dependencies 
that comprise the English-speaking Caribbean (either formerly of the British Empire or 
still territories of the United Kingdom) are as follows: Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Dominica, 
Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and Turks and Caicos (Meditz & Hanratty, 1989). 
When people think of the Caribbean, they usually think of the islands that are in the 
Caribbean Sea; however, the Caribbean is more than just those islands (Payne, 1995). 
The Caribbean also includes Guyana in South America and Belize, which is in Central 
America. Bermuda, although not located in the Caribbean Sea, is also considered part of 
the Caribbean, or a part of the British West Indies.  
For many years, the primary economic activity for the majority of the English-
speaking Caribbean has been agriculture, and over the past decade and a half, services 
(i.e., financial, tourism, etc.) have become a contributor to the economy (Beckford & 
Campbell, 2013). In 1998, throughout the Caribbean, there was a movement to reform the 
telecommunications sector. Similar to American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) in the 
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United States, within the English-speaking Caribbean, the telecommunications 
monopolies responded negatively to the call for reform, often referred to as liberalization. 
The industry’s reform would not be driven by internal forces in the Caribbean countries. 
Instead, reform was driven by external bodies, such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), and by technological advances that were outside the span of control of the 
incumbent telephone companies and the local laws. Despite the lack of pressure from 
internal forces, the telecommunications monopolies were entrenched within these 
English-speaking Caribbean societies that telecommunications companies were still able 
to exert enough pressure on lawmakers to make policy change in telecommunications 
difficult to pass without the lawmakers consulting these companies (Stirton & Lodge, 
2002). 
Before the privatization efforts of the 1980s, the telephone companies in these 
Caribbean countries were government-owned, and they were, therefore, at first self-
regulated. After the governments initially privatized the telephone companies, the 
companies continued to be self-regulated. The governments lacked the human capacity 
for regulating the industry. Cable &Wireless, a transnational British company, purchased 
most of the governments’ telephone interests throughout most of the English-speaking 
Caribbean; Guyana, Belize, and the Bahamas were the only exceptions.  
In 1989, the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM, 2013) 
heads of government established the Caribbean Telecommunications Union (CTU). Until 
this time, the role the governments played was limited to the price and availability of 
telephone services throughout the countries. In the mid-1990s, their interests soon 
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encompassed the broader telecommunications services. The formation of the CTU was 
driven by changes in telecommunications that began in the rest of the world. The 
Caribbean countries’ political interests in telecommunications reform were driven by the 
desire to develop the ICT sector, but were also largely motivated by the desire to protect 
the agricultural base. Wanting continued access to worldwide markets, especially those of 
Europe where concessions were made for the banana and sugar industries, government 
officials opened trade in the ICT sector to continue protection for agriculture (Kwa, 1999; 
Raworth, 2005). 
Competition is commonplace in the telecommunications sector. Spulber 
suggested that “economic textbooks have held up the telecommunications industry as the 
ideal model of a natural monopoly” (as cited in Thierer, 1994, p. 268). A natural 
monopoly occurs whenever “a single firm is able to control most, if not all, output and 
prices in each market due to the enormous entry barriers and economies of scale 
associated with the industry” (Thierer, 1994, p. 268). Telecommunications was 
considered a natural monopoly because of the cost associated with offering services, such 
as laying cables and building switching stations (Thierer, 1994, p. 268). Only 
governments or multinational firms that sought high rates of returns could afford the high 
cost of construction of networks, and they only built and expanded networks in what they 
perceived as the most economically viable areas. 
The policymakers (political directorate) had the task of implementing a new 
competitive telecommunications sector. As Spiller and Sampson (1994) indicated, these 
policymakers, who initially privatized monopoly telecommunications companies because 
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they thought that having a private monopoly would be beneficial for their countries’ 
economies, were faced with a monopolistic entity that wanted super profits with 
continuous price adjustments and limited oversight (p. 44). Caribbean policymakers did 
not introduce a change that would offer competition to the telecommunications sector.  
The movement from a monopolistic telecommunications environment to a 
competitive market in the English-speaking Caribbean was not uniform. Government 
ministers throughout CARICOM formed a telecommunications body, the CTU, and this 
entity operated similar to ITU within the United Nations. The Treaty of Chaguaramas 
allowed for the formation of the CTU (2017). Although this treaty was intended to deal 
primarily with trade issues, the CARICOM created a body to deal with 
telecommunications even before the WTO was created. From the beginning, the CTU had 
limited powers in its ability to influence the policies of the countries it was designed to 
assist. The treaty was only ratified and accepted over a decade later (CARICOM, 2017). 
Ministers responsible for the telecommunications portfolio did not abide by the CTU’s 
recommendations until 1999, when the possibility of a new telecommunications 
paradigm arose. St. Lucia’s telecommunications monopoly license came to an end, and 
the WTO began using the CTU as a conduit for information. When the WTO partnered 
with the CTU, it brought the issues that the CTU was already advocating to the various 
Caribbean countries, and the governments were able to present a more unified and 




St. Lucia’s negotiations with its telecommunications monopoly provider was 
critical to the success of the whole region, because when St. Lucia’s domestic license 
officially ended in September 2000, the St. Lucian government only extended it to March 
2001 (Anthony, 2010). The St. Lucian government granted an extension for only 1 year 
to indicate to the monopolist provider, Cable &Wireless, that St. Lucia would not 
negotiate unless Cable &Wireless was also willing to negotiate simultaneously with the 
other English-speaking Caribbean countries. At the time, Cable & Wireless controlled 
telecommunications in nearly all of the English-speaking Caribbean with exclusivity 
licenses, with the exception of Belize, the Bahamas, and Guyana. 
While Cable &Wireless was negotiating with the other islands, Marpin, a small 
provider in Dominica, decided to challenge that monopoly. Marpin “sought declaratory 
and other relief sunder the Fundamentals Rights Provision of the Constitution of 
Dominica” and “The High Court and later the Court of Appeal, agreed with Marpin that 
the exclusivity conferred by the licenses secured by Cable & Wireless was [indeed] in 
contravention of the Constitution” (Anthony, 2010, p. 8). Marpin’s win meant that 
although Cable & Wireless had an exclusive license in place, communication was a right 
of any human being, and an exclusive license was unlawful and unenforceable. 
From a regulatory perspective, Baldwin and Cave (1999) stated, “[r]egulation 
can be seen to be centrally concerned with the control of risks” (p. 138). St. Lucia 
attempted to minimize Cable & Wireless’s impact on the country by including other 
countries in its negotiation. Cable & Wireless agreed to simultaneously negotiate with all 
the countries. The political risks associated with this new paradigm of moving away from 
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negotiating alone were minimized for St. Lucia and the rest of the Caribbean. The 
countries all agreed that a collective approach was the best strategy for bargaining with 
telecommunications providers. 
Jamaica believed in the collective approach, but was further along than the rest 
of the Caribbean in the liberalization of the telecommunications sector; it had passed the 
necessary laws to establish an independent utilities regulator, the Office of Utilities 
Regulation (OUR). Other English-speaking Caribbean nations, as well as St. Lucia, were 
yet to establish or create terms of engagement (for negotiation) with the incumbent that 
had only agreed to the negotiated collective process in principle. Although all of these 
Caribbean countries are formally tied to CARICOM (which deals with these collective 
issues as a single entity), there was a degree of rivalry that existed between the countries. 
Jamaica, having the largest population, believed that it should lead the way in terms of 
negotiating with Cable & Wireless, and so began bilateral negotiations. If the 
negotiations proved unsuccessful, then Jamaica would join the collective negotiations 
with the other countries as a last resort. 
Baldwin and Cave (1999) discussed the “regulatory challenges or risks” that 
needed to be minimized as a matter of priority if they are to meet “public approval” (p. 
142). If the people of St. Lucia approved St. Lucia’s plan, no government that opposed 
the plan would have been willing to complain, because several other Eastern Caribbean 
countries had joined the collective bargaining. As Anthony (2010) indicated, Cable & 
Wireless “[was] the most hated company operating in St. Lucia,” and this was equally 
true in the other Caribbean countries where they operated (p. 8). Jamaica believed that the 
8 
 
public would consider the breaking of Cable & Wireless’s exclusivity, which extended to 
the year 2038. Public opinion is classified as a “noneconomic consideration,” and Kahn 
(1993) believed that “noneconomic considerations” are critical in making regulatory 
decisions and that “noneconomic considerations intrude” even when proper market and 
economic efficiency can be made (p. 189). For years, the costs of maintaining the 
monopoly did not matter to these Caribbean countries, as they believed they were 
obligated to honor the exclusive contract. According to Kahn, the idea of “social or 
political objectives” is oftentimes “brought to bear on public [decisions] and often 
involve, explicitly or implicitly, a purely economic judgment that the private market 
provides insufficient consumption because the external benefits are large” (p. 190). Kahn 
recognized that the politics intrude or even override proper economic principles. Hence, 
the plan by the minister in Jamaica to be the first Caribbean country to have bilateral 
negotiations with the incumbent while maintaining an alternative plan was a social 
objective in which there were external benefits. In addition, the minister knew he would 
have the support of the public and constituents. Reform of the telecommunications sector 
then became easier for the other governments. 
Telecommunications reform would have been easier to achieve by the Caribbean 
policy makers. However, small island developing states (SIDS) are not studied as much, 
and it has been observed that the requirements for growth are different from larger 
countries. This study added to the body of knowledge and filled the gap in the existing 
literature as to the role that independent telecommunications regulator plays in the 




The WTO governs the trade agreements that various countries create. The WTO 
(2014) stated that a country must form a “regulatory body [that] is separate from, and not 
accountable to, any supplier of basic telecommunications services” (p. 5). On the other 
hand, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), whose 
members are developed countries, promoted the idea that more effective regulation could 
be obtained with less “political interference” through “structural independence” by 
having independent regulators (Min, 2000, p. 4). Both organizations believe that 
telecommunications regulatory bodies should be autonomous in a way that is similar to 
those of developed countries, such as the United States, which has the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC). However, in many Caribbean nations, any change 
in the political administration does not include an automatic change in the leadership of 
regulatory institutions. This lack of change in the regulatory body while political 
administrations change causes tension between the two entities. Additionally, not all 
countries of the Commonwealth created independent regulatory bodies (see Table 1); for 
example, the governments of Antigua and Barbuda and Bermuda have control of their 
telecommunications sector (ITU, 2004; Ministry of the Environment, 














Date Created by 
Legislative Fiat 
Anguilla Independent Public Utilities Commission 2003 
Antigua & Barbuda Dependent Ministry of Telecommunications 1951 
Bahamas Independent Utilities Regulation Competition Authority 2009 
Barbados Independent Fair Trading Commission 2002 
Belize Independent Public Utilities Commission 2001 
 
Bermuda 
Dependent/Independent Department of Telecommunications/ 





Independent Telecommunications Regulatory 
Commission 
2006 
Cayman Islands Independent Information & Communication Technology 
Authority 
2011 
Dominica Independent Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications 




Guyana Independent Public Utilities Commission 1999 
Grenada Independent Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications 




Jamaica Independent Office of Utilities Regulation 1997 
St. Kitts &Nevis Independent Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications 




St. Lucia Independent Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications 




St. Vincent & the 
Grenadines 
Independent Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications 




Montserrat Independent Montserrat Info-Communications Authority 2009 
Trinidad & Tobago Independent Telecommunications Authority of Trinidad 
and Tobago 
2001 
Turks & Caicos 
Islands 







The Caribbean countries that created independent regulators adopted the stance 
that independence meant autonomy in terms of WTO regulations. The idea of autonomy 
for regulatory bodies came from the OECD countries and institutions such as the World 
Bank, the International Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
to minimize governments’ expediency. Those institutions pushed the idea onto various 
nations (Cόrdova-Novion & Hanlon, 2002; Intven et al., 2000). Although the WTO did 
not include the Commonwealth Caribbean within its trading framework, they were 
included incidentally because the United Nations views Latin American and Caribbean 
countries as one entity (United Nations, 2013). 
Developing countries are generally categorized by international agencies as only 
having varying degrees of poverty. As Torres (as cited in Courtright, 2004) explained that 
although international agencies view developing countries as unique, they consider the 
countries as “homogenized by poverty,” with variations only existing in the size of the 
problem (p. 352). International agencies, such as the World Bank and the IMF, 
recommended that the Caribbean countries create the same regulatory institutional 
framework, namely a policy allowing for an independent telecommunications regulator, 
just as larger countries have. These external institutions neglected to perform a cost-
benefit analysis to determine the value of these independent telecommunications 
regulatory institutions to each respective small economy. The WTO recognizes that small 
economies are different than larger ones and are, therefore, at a disadvantage by certain 
rules, such as having to implement telecommunications reform (Moore, 2001). Little is 
known about the impact that an independent telecommunications regulatory framework 
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or independent telecommunications regulator has on a small developing state in the 
English-speaking Caribbean (Symeou & Pollit, 2007; Sutherland, 2009). Scholars have 
primarily focused on larger, industrial or developing economies, and the positive impact 
the telecommunications regulatory institutions have on those economies. Sufficient 
research on the impact of telecommunications regulatory institutions on smaller 
economies has not been conducted. Therefore, this dissertation filled the gap that existed 
in the literature about the impact of independent telecommunications regulatory 
institutions on small economies, recognizing that such economies may have differing 
developmental national policies than their larger counterparts. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to examine the effects of the two 
differing telecommunications regulatory regimes on telecommunications sector tariffs, 
telecommunications Internet services, telecommunications investment, and policy 
mechanisms of both independent and nonindependent regulators on small economies of 
the Commonwealth Caribbean. Knowledge of the effects of these differing regulatory 
regimes may help small country governments in creating policies that will be optimal for 
the development of their telecommunications and their economies. All of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean nations are considered small countries or even microstates. 
According to Ofa (2012), small economies have problems that are unique to them, 
especially regarding the ICT sector. Based on the findings of this study, I developed 
guidelines and recommendations for the regulatory body appropriate for the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. I determined whether it was prudent for Caribbean 
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governments that have not yet established any regulatory institutions to set them up, 
either as independent of the ministry or as a governmental department. Other 
governments may use the information from this study to determine whether to keep or 
make defunct existing independent telecommunications agencies. Additionally, the 
information may assist international institutions in revising their policies on independent 
telecommunications institutions for small states. 
Research Questions and Hypothesis 
The overarching question that guided this study was the following: How do 
independent regulators affect the economic development of the telecommunications 
sector in small developing island states? 
1. How are telecommunications infrastructure in fixed line services affected 
by regulatory regime, population, telecommunications investment, competition in the 
telecoms sector, gross domestic product (GDP) and telephone tariffs?  
H01: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone 
tariffs do not have any effect on the dependent variable fixed line services. 
H11: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone 
tariffs do affect the dependent variable fixed line services. 
2. How are telecommunications infrastructure in cellular services affected by 
the regulatory regime, population, telecommunications investment, competition in the 
telecoms sector, GDP and telephone tariffs? 
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H02: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone 
tariffs do not have any effect on the dependent variable cellular services. 
H12: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone 
tariffs do affect the dependent variable cellular services. 
3. How are telecommunications infrastructure in universal services (i.e., 
fixed lines and cellular services) affected by the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, competition in the telecoms sector, GDP and telephone 
tariffs? 
H03: The independent of regulatory regime, population, telecommunications 
investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone tariffs do not have 
any effect on the dependent variable universal services. 
H13: The independent of regulatory regime, population, telecommunications 
investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone tariffs do affect the 
dependent variable universal services. 
4. What is the relationship between prices in the telecoms sector (telephone 
tariffs) and the regulatory regime, population, telecommunications investment, 
competition in the telecoms sector, GDP? 
H04: Independent variables of the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do not 
have any effect on the dependent variable prices. 
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H14: Independent variables of the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do affect 
the dependent variable prices. 
5. What is the relationship between telecoms investment and the regulatory 
regime, population, telecommunications prices, competition in the telecoms sector, and 
GDP? 
H05: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do not 
have any effect on the dependent variable telecoms investment. 
H15: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector does affect 
the dependent variable telecoms investment. 
6. What is the relationship between broadband usage and the regulatory 
regime, population, telecommunications prices, competition in the telecoms sector, and 
GDP? 
H06: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do not 
have any effect on the dependent variable broadband usage. 
H16: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do affect 
the dependent variable broadband usage. 
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7. What is the relationship between competition in telecoms sector and 
regulatory regime, population, telecommunication prices, and GDP? 
H07: No relationship exists between independent variables of regulatory regime 
population, telecommunication prices, and GDP. 
H17: No relationship exists between independent variables of regulatory regime 
population, telecommunication prices, and GDP. 
Theoretical Framework 
 The reason governments intervene in a market is usually explained through social 
theory (Posner, 1974). In economic regulation, intervention is mainly found in monopoly 
suppliers’ arenas (Carpenter & Moss, 2013). Although there are several theories that 
could explain the differing regulatory frameworks of each country, in this study, I used 
capture theory. Capture theory is related to rent-seeking theory. Regulatory capture refers 
to when government corporations and regulatory bodies that were mandated to ensure 
that public needs are met act selectively to promote established players in the industry. 
This change to being captured in behavior that generally occurs over time (Etzioni, 
2009). 
The results of capture are a shift of the regulatory agencies’ loyalty from the 
public to private interest and the loss of neutrality and impartiality. The ties that develop 
between regulatory officials and officials of private organizations can result in bias in 
executing regulatory duties, which will lead to favors and protection of these 
organizations being regulated at the expense of the public interest (Hamilton, 2013). 
Capture theory is used to explain how regulatory frameworks in each country was 
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developed, and it can be used as a foundation by a small developing 
countries/governments deciding whether or not to create an independent 
telecommunications regulatory agency. Regulatory capture involves the government or 
its agencies being beholden to other market players, which could include both private 
sector players and the government itself. The governments of small developing countries 
are often vulnerable to regulatory capture and rent seeking in the name of good 
governance. 
Nature of the Study 
I used an econometric approach to examine the relationship between the 
dependent and control variables; I used a cross-sectional time series model from 1993 to 
2012. This model fits this research because only annual data were available, so the 
number of observations was limited. This methodology allows for a study of the variables 
that would not be readily available via a purely cross-sectional or time series model, 
because “variability is negligible, or not existent, across either time or space” (Podesta, 
2000, p. 8). Because the observation period was limited to only 20 years, annual data 
box-Jenkins or auto regressive moving average were not suitable for the analysis. A 
cross-sectional panel model allows for the simultaneous capture of the variation over time 
and space. I also used a fixed-effects model to indicate that certain features do not change 
over time within a country but can be correlated with the regulatory regime and 
competition within said country. The regression equation is time-invariant, thereby 
addressing omitted variable bias (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). The 
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data for this research came primarily from the ITU, the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), the Caribbean Development Bank, and the World Bank. 
Definitions 
There were some key terms and definitions that were used in this study that may 
differ from general use outside of this public policy making context and academic study. 
The dependent and independent variables are defined in Chapter 3. 
Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority (ECTEL): The regulatory 
institution that is responsible for telecommunications in the Eastern Caribbean States that 
are members. “It is made up of three components – A Council of Ministers, a regional 
Directorate and a National Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (NTRC) in each 
Member State” (ECTEL, 2018, p. 2). 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU): The U.N. agency for ICT. They 
are responsible for “global radio spectrum and satellite orbits, develop the technical 
standards that ensure networks and technologies seamlessly interconnect, and strive to 
improve access to ICTs to underserved communities worldwide” (ITU, 2018, p. 1). 
National Telecommunications Regulatory Commissions (NTRC): The country-
level regulators within the Eastern Caribbean member states of ECTEL. Their 
responsibility is to advise the responsible minister and process applications on the award 
of licenses (ECTEL, 2018). 
Office of Utilities Regulation (OUR): The multisector regulator of Jamaica whose 
responsibility includes telecommunications, electricity, and water/sewage. It had also 
regulated transportation but that was removed from its remit in 2014 (OUR, 2018). 
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World Trade Organization (WTO): “The only global international organization 
dealing with the rules of trade between nations” (WTO, 2018, p. 1). Also, “it operates a 
global system of trade rules, it acts as a forum for negotiating trade agreements, it settles 
trade disputes between its members and it supports the needs of developing countries” 
(WTO, 2018, p. 1). 
Assumptions 
 The data that were used in this study were numbers published by the institutions 
of the ITU, World Bank, and the local telecommunications regulators that would have 
access to said information. Although these data are also generally accepted by the 
institutions to be inherently correct, the local government institutions that report the 
information can have differing interpretations as to the definition used by the 
international institutions. As pointed out by the ITU (2018),  
Data are available for over 200 economies. However, it should be noted that since 
ITU relies primarily on official economy data, availability of data for the different 
indicators and years varies. Notes explaining data exceptions are also included. 
The data are collected from an annual questionnaire sent to official economy 
contacts, usually the regulatory authority or the ministry in charge of 
telecommunication and ICT. Additional data are obtained from reports provided 
by telecommunication ministries, regulators and operators and from ITU staff 
reports. In some cases, estimates are made by ITU staff; these are noted in the 
database. (para. 4) 
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However, this information was assumed to be accurate and complete and was analyzed 
for any outliers as part of the general econometric data analysis. 
Scope and Delimitations 
The scope of this dissertation was limited to the available data. I selected all 17 of 
the English-speaking Caribbean countries and Bermuda, some of which are still 
dependencies of England, for the analysis. The data might be unreliable, because the 
government in power may sometimes under or overreport various statistics. Additionally, 
the methods used by various governments to collect data on the same indicator and the 
challenge of reliable data sources are problematic (Roshanthi & Rohan, 2013). Therefore, 
information given to the ITU is not as exact as it should be; therefore, a degree of bias 
exists. However, the cross-sectional component compensates for and corrects that bias. 
I did not take into consideration the type of independence of each regulatory 
body. Both structural and functional independence exist; however, I only considered 
structurally independent bodies, and I defined them as any independent agency that is not 
directly funded by the central government and stands alone pursuant to some act or law. 
Limitations 
The limitations of this study included how the study was set up using panel data. 
In any given study, the results and analysis are only as valid as the type of data that are 
inputted. All useful econometric models require “valid, reproducible and accurate time 
series” (Alleman et al., n.d., p. 4.1). The data collected for this study were primarily from 
the ITU statistics, of which electronic sources may be different than the published version 
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of the same data. This panel data allowed me to look at each of the individual Caribbean 
countries in my sample over the given time period, in this instance 20 years. 
Any pooled time series analysis begins with the general assumption that it 
behaves like a standard least-squares model. However, once the model is a pooled one, 
there is a correction for nonstochastic variables that are generally included (Sayrs, 1989). 
Additionally, pooling tends to cause the error to be contaminated from “time points 
within one cross-section” or from “correlation in the error” from differing “cross-sections 
at the same time point or from different cross-sections and different time points” (Sayrs, 
1989, p. 13). The validity concerns will be addressed in Chapter 3. 
Significance and Social Change Implications 
SIDS, according to the United Nations Office of the High Representative for the 
Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries, and SIDS (UN-
OHRLLS, 2011), are a “distinct group of developing countries facing specific social, 
economic and environmental vulnerabilities” (p. 2). All of the English-speaking 
Caribbean countries are considered SIDS, either because of geography or population size. 
They are generally coerced into making policy decisions that are not necessarily 
sustainable or suitable. With the promise of certain concessions by larger countries, they 
usually accept these policies. Other SIDS adopted said policies in the hopes of also 
increasing social welfare for their citizens. However, policies that are reasonable for large 
countries do not necessarily impact SIDS in the same way. For example, the large 
countries that created independent telecommunication agencies have created a better 
telecommunications sector for themselves, but this may not necessarily be true for SIDS. 
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As various SIDS continue to contemplate the policy of an independent 
telecommunications regulator, the findings of this research should add to the debate in the 
country about the necessity of independent telecommunications regulators. Additionally, 
SIDS need to evaluate the cost benefit of implementing a policy creating a regulatory 
framework to accommodate an independent telecommunications agency and, if they do 
decide to implement such a policy, they need to ensure that it is tailored to reflect their 
circumstances. 
Summary 
 This quantitative study comprised a public policy and administrative exploration 
into the challenge of determining the telecommunications regulatory framework that 
would be suitable for a SIDs. The overarching research question was the following: How 
do independent regulators affect the economic development of the telecommunications 
sector in small developing island states? A cross-sectional time series analysis was used 
to determine the possible relationships that may exist with these variables. By addressing 
this issue as a public policy concern, the study will add to the debate as to the best policy 
in determining what telecommunications framework would be optimal. 
In Chapter 1, I presented the overview of the quantitative research study. Chapter 
2 includes an exploration of regulatory theory of capture and external factors such as the 
WTO on telecommunications reform in the Caribbean, along with various reforms that 
have occurred, and the quantitative research design. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The telecommunications regulatory frameworks of independently regulated and 
government-regulated activity have differing effects on the small economies of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. Regulatory theory is significant to public sector reforms and 
actions. Although there has been the creation of independent telecommunications 
regulatory institutions in many of the English-speaking Caribbean countries, the 
effectiveness of these institutions on the respective economies has not been measured. 
The theoretical lens through which I examined telecommunications reforms and the 
public policy actions was capture theory. In the literature review, I explain how the 
various telecommunications regulatory frameworks came about, and the rationale behind 
the statistical analysis that will be completed in the subsequent chapters. In Chapter 2, I 
will provide a synthesis of the literature reviewed and an overview of my research 
methodology. I will consider regulation as well as define independent regulation, and 
then provide a detailed analysis of the types of regulatory capture that can occur. I will 
follow with a historical context of independent regulation in the. At the end of Chapter 2, 
I will draw conclusions that will be applied to Chapter 3. 
Literature Search Strategy 
The use of the Internet was the principal search vehicle through which I obtained 
the literature for this review. This included the use of online libraries and academic 
research databases. Among the journal databases searched, those that generated the most 
applicable results were Sage, JSTOR, EBSCO, Wiley, and Elsevier. Key terms used in 
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the searches included capture theory and independent regulatory agencies, regulatory 
capture and developing countries, and SIDS and capture theory. I accessed a multitude of 
other databases during the search process as well. I selected the peer-reviewed feature to 
ensure that all of the literature generated would fit this designation. 
I reviewed current literature containing empirical research in the relevant areas, 
which appeared in a range of publications, such as the Journal of Economic Literature, 
the International Review of Social Sciences, Policy Studies Journal, Econ Journal Watch, 
and the American Political Science Review. I identified articles in searches conducted 
using Google Scholar, with a preference for peer-reviewed journals, and through Internet 
search engines such as Google and Scirus, with a filter applied for peer-reviewed 
journals. Additionally, once I had identified key authors in this manner, the corpus of 
their work was reviewed for other relevant research, and other works cited by those 
authors were similarly reviewed. I reviewed identified journals, particularly in 
specifically-themed issues, for other relevant work. 
Theoretical Foundation 
 The theoretical basis of this study was about the effectiveness of the English-
speaking Caribbean independent telecommunications regulators within the public policy-
making context of regulatory capture. However, it is important to understand why 
governments wish to intervene in certain sectors of the economy and regulate how 
companies in those sectors behave. According to Dudley and Brito (2012), governments 
intervene or regulate various economic sectors because of the perception that there is 
some market failure. Such market failures take the form of a deviation from a perfectly 
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competitive market. In trying to rationalize why regulation takes place, several 
conceptual frameworks have been developed, including a distinction between economic 
and social types of regulation (Viscusi, Harrington, & Vernon, 1996). Economic 
regulation includes aspects of entry into and exit from a market, prices on the market, and 
quality of service issues. Social regulation deals with environmental and consumer-
related matters (Hertog, 1999). Economic regulation is generally imposed on monopoly 
suppliers, especially those specializing in public utilities. The theories can be further 
divided into “positive and normative theories” (Hertog, 1999, p. 224). The former is what 
truly occurs, and the latter reflects what should ideally occur (Felkins, 2013). 
Regulation Defined 
Although Hertog (1999) posited that there is no definition of regulation in any 
available economic and legal literature, McLean (2002) stated, “Regulation has been in 
existence for as long as governments have interfered in private actions: that is, forever” 
(p. 2). McLean also indicated that regulation started out as a good idea and was not the 
mere “naked expropriation of one group in favor of another” (p. 2). 
According Baldwin and Cave (as cited in Baldwin, Scott, & Hood, 1998), 
regulation “is spoken about as if [it is] an identifiable and discrete mode of governmental 
activity” (p. 2.). Selznick regarded it as “the sustained and focused control implemented 
by a public agency over actions that are valued by a community” (as cited in Baldwin & 
Cave, 1999, p. 2). However, this definition differs from Stigler’s (1971) definition. 
Stigler suggested that industries and the private sector have created their own standards 
of operation, which they then operate for their own benefit. Stigler believed that 
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industries need protection, probably from the community, while Baldwin and Cave (as 
cited in Baldwin, Scott, & Hood, 1998) perceived the community as needing protection 
from the industries. 
Becker’s views on regulation are not synonymous with Baldwin and Cave’s. 
Becker (1976) stated, “A firm is said to be in a monopolistic position when its demand 
curve is negatively inclined in such a way that a monopolist would maximize his income 
at the output level where marginal revenue equals marginal cost” (p. 94). Government 
regulations arise when the government, or the regulator, plays the role of the market in 
determining the marginal prices that monopolistic companies should charge. Becker also 
discussed regulation. Becker stated: 
For at least 200 years, economists have been trying to understand why some 
industries are competitive and others monopolistic. And for an almost equally 
long period, two competing explanations have been offered: one stresses the 
technological conditions that make monopoly inevitable, the other stresses the 
incentives to come together to suppress competition. (p. 95) 
In each of these explanations offered by Becker, regulation must take place or, more 
specifically, governments have to regulate monopolistic firms to enjoy profits. 
Kahn (1993) stated that regulation is generally viewed as “maintaining the 
institutions within whose framework the free market can continue to function; and 
enforcing, supplementing and removing the imperfections of competition” (p. 2). Kahn 
discussed regulation primarily in terms of public utilities, whose “acceptable performance 
is attributed not to competition or self-restraint but to direct government involvement in 
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the major aspects of their structures and economic performance” (p. 3). Without the 
government regulating monopolies, firms would strive to achieve high profits to the 
detriment of the public. Kahn also dealt with “the legal rationale” (p. 3). This is the right 
of a government to regulate monopolies. Kahn indicated that the right to regulate is 
driven by the fact that individual states within the United States had to give up the right 
of way when it came to public property; governments were, therefore, obliged to impose 
on the operators “various regulatory conditions” (Kahn, 1993, p. 3). 
The following is a summary of the theoretical economic rationale behind 
regulation, as stated by Kahn (1993): 
1. Monopolistic industries (especially public utilities) are important to the growth of 
the entire economy, because they contribute to the total national output. They also 
supply essential inputs to other industries. 
2. Most of the utility companies are monopoly providers; therefore, their costs tend 
to be lower if they are the sole suppliers of a commodity in the market. 
3. Due to a variety of possible reasons, competition does not work well in the sector. 
With the exception of Stigler (1971), the aforementioned theorists all believe that 
government regulation of monopoly providers is there for the protection of consumers. 
Stigler, on the other hand, believed that it is the monopoly providers who need protection 
from society. 
Independent Regulation 
The concept of independent regulation stems from the idea of central bank 
independence (CBI), which refers to the separation of monetary policy makers from those 
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in political administration. Walsh (2005) reported that, during the 1970s and 1980s, 
industrialized economies had long inflationary periods because of the political 
authorities’ short-term plans to meet expansionary goals at the expense of longer-term 
inflationary effects. Walsh stated, “If the ability of elected officials to distort monetary 
policy results in excessive inflation, then countries whose central banks are independent 
of such pressure should experience lower rates of inflation,” and the empirical evidence 
suggests the same (p. 2). Hence, an independent regulatory body that is separated from 
the political directorate was needed for more stable inflation rates. Stern and Trillas 
(2001) reported that the effects of an independent central bank on the macroeconomic 
situation of a country are generally good for a country. Stern and Trillas also pointed out 
that there are similarities between independent central banks and independent 
telecommunications regulators: Both have a need for consistent policies and similar 
organizational design (Stern &Trillas, 2001). In order for an independent regulator to be 
successful, the political directorate should not interfere with its operations. 
However, Hayo and Hefeker (2002) challenged the CBI idea and believed that, 
although there may be a statistical correlation between low inflation rates and perceived 
CBI, low inflation has more to do with the conservatism of a country and its political 
influence than with CBI. Hayo and Hefeker used Japan as an example, because it has low 
inflation rates, although its central bank works with the ministry of finance. Additionally, 
Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992) found that “Legal independence (of the Central 
Bank) is inversely related to inflation in industrial (countries),” but they further suggested 
that, for developing countries, “the more frequently the chief executive (of the central 
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bank) is changed, the higher the measure of its independence” (p. 353). Generally, in the 
Caribbean there is not independence in the activities of the central banks, because the 
banks’ chief executives rarely change. 
Regulatory independence consists of three major elements: an independent 
relationship where the parties act in their own interests to regulate firms and consumers, 
political authorities, and organizational autonomy (Smith, 1997). Brown et al. (2006) 
described the idea of regulatory independence, indicating that it is merely “decision-
making independence” in that the regulator does not consult any entity or person before 
making a decision, but may instead consult a court of law or an appellate body set up to 
oversee the regulatory institution (p. 50). Wu (2004) stated that the indicators of true 
independence have to do with “the stability of its leadership, the scope of its authority, 
and the independence of its funding” (p. 6). Regulatory independence is important 
because, without it, all of the identified entities (ie., regulated firms, consumers, and 
political authorities) would act in their own interests. An example of why self-interest 
should not be allowed to override public interests occurred when, as Jamison (2009) 
reported, the Iowa governor appointed Commissioner Dennis Nagel to the Iowa Utilities 
Board and asked Nagel not to do anything that would cost the governor the next election. 
The governor failed to mention the protection of shareholders or consumers, or even legal 
compliance (Jamison, 2009). The role of the regulator is a balancing act. Smith (1997) 
described it as “special challenges” that face a utility regulator; hence, a regulator needs 
to be independent in order to make the best decision (p. 3). 
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According to Brown et al. (2006), there are two main features to regulation: 
“Regulatory governance” and “regulatory substance” (p. 19). Regulatory governance 
includes ideas such as “accountability of the regulator” and “the relationship between 
policy makers and the regulator” (Brown et al., 2006, p. 19). Regulatory substance, on the 
other hand, deals with determining tariffs and the quality of service by the operator 
(Brown et al., 2006). Conversely, Smith (1997) believed that regulation has three main 
aims: to protect consumers from abuse by firms, to support firms or investors from 
arbitrary actions by government, and to promote economic efficiency. As Mohammed 
and Strobl (2011) stated, there is a positive effect on access to telephone services when 
there is an “independent regulator” and “privatization,” which form the basis of 
telecommunications reforms (p. 93-94). Mohammed and Strobl concluded that, for the 
“efficient development of the telecommunications industry in a developing country,” 
there must be a “separate regulatory body” and that this body must be functional (p. 95). 
The Caribbean countries that created independent telecommunications institutions did so 
through legislative means that made the regulatory governance transparent. 
Research Design 
There is a relationship between the independent telecommunications regulator and 
the various economic and telecommunications network variables. Income and market 
reform (i.e., competition) and the size of the network are among the primary drivers of 
growth (Banerjee & Ros, 2004). Mohamed and Strobl (2009) indicated that an 
independent regulator is also relevant and important for the growth of fixed networks (p. 
92). Although there is research on fixed networks or mobile networks in developing 
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countries, these are substitutable, and mobile networks are fast replacing fixed networks, 
as copper is being replaced by wireless or mobile. There have been several quantitative 
studies on the relationship between the regulator and the telecommunications industry 
(Baudrier, 2001; Symeou & Pollit, 2007). Additionally, there have been several time 
series studies and panel data studies that relate to the choice of economic variables and 
the regulator, but these variables have been on developed and/or larger developing 
countries (Baudrier, 2001; Mohamed & Strobl, 2010; Ros & Banerjee, 2000; Trillas, 
2010). 
Time Series, Panel Data, and Variables 
A precedent has been provided by using other times series and panel data analysis 
on the impact of a regulator (Mohammed & Strobl, 2011). I replicated previous studies, 
substituting data from the Caribbean countries. The independent regulator binary variable 
(1–yes, 0–no) was used as the explanatory variable. To take the panel structure of the 
data into account (repeated measures over countries and years), each regression also 
included country-fixed effects that allow the intercept of the regression model to vary by 
country, thus accounting for time-invariant, cross-country differences. The dependent 
variables were log-transformed, so that the effect of the regulator’s independence can be 
expressed in percentages. 
The literature has given guidance on the variables of choice. The ITU dataset is 
annual, runs from 1993 to 2012, allows for a period of time during which the 
telecommunications framework was nonindependent, across the time period that an 
independent framework was created. Additionally, this fits in with the ITU data for their 
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given 20-year period. In some instances, the change in the regulatory framework would 
have been allowed to have existed for at least 10 years. One notable variable exception in 
the data is the existence of an external event that had the effect of almost destroying one 
of the islands, namely a volcano in Montserrat. 
The main variable of interest for this research (i.e., the independent variable) was 
the telecommunications sector and the economy. Although there are many degrees of 
independence, such as functional independence, I was concerned only with statutory 
independence (i.e., independence created by legislative fiat). The decision as to the 
creation of an independent regulator is one of public record, primarily due to an act of the 
government. This variable was created as a simple 0-1 type dummy variable. The result 
would be 0 for each year before the legislative fiat for the creation of the regulator, and 1 
for each year thereafter. 
In accordance with standard practice and consistent with the hypothesis, the 
primary variable was the penetration level of basic telecommunications services (which 
was the sum of both fixed and mobile customers). I used data from both the World Bank 
and the ITU databases. Following standard practice, the dependent variable in the model 
specification was fixed/mainline per capita, and it represented the fixed level of 
penetration for telecommunications (Baudrier, 2001; Mohammed &Stobl, 2009; 
Wallsten, 2001). However, unlike what previous standard models have presented, the 
updated form of the model included information about mobile penetration, because it was 
a possible substitute for fixed lines (Van der Berg & Song, 2012; Ward & Woroch, 
2004). Both the World Bank and the ITU have compiled data on both main/fixed lines 
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and mobile/cellular information. The sum of these two variables creates a dependent 
variable. Although cellular service was considered relatively new and less regulated, it 
was accepted as a viable solution in developing countries, because the infrastructure costs 
associated with wireless are less than the infrastructure costs of other network solutions.  
 Tariffs are considered the main reason for telecommunications regulators. The 
prices that consumers face can determine their demand for telecommunications services 
(Trillas, 2010); regulators tend balance between consumers and providers. Regulators 
ensure providers are compensated for their service, but also limit any super profits 
(Wheatley, 1999). There have been several studies relating to various tariffs (i.e., prices 
offered by providers to their customers). 
 Internet or Broadband usage is one of the cornerstones that richer nations have 
more of and poorer nations have less of, and it is believed that Internet services “has had 
measurable effects on economic growth for all nations” (Jorgenson & Vu, 2016, p. 384). 
Wallsten (2002) recognized that there is a correlation between the telecoms regulatory 
approach to Internet service providers and the number of Internet users (p. 14). 
 A regulatory framework and regulators impact both the telecoms investment and 
economic growth of a country (Telecommunications Development Sector of the ITU, 
2012). According to the Telecommunications Development Sector of the ITU (2012), 
telecoms investment does have an impact on both developed and developing countries. 
Regulators do play a role as to the quantity and type of investment that occurs in a given 




Regulatory Capture Theory 
 According to the theory of regulatory capture, the administrative agencies 
established to protect the interests of the general public from private business entities 
serve the benefits of those private bodies instead of safeguarding the rights and interests 
of the public (Schultz, 2004, p. 363). Such agencies are said to have been captured by 
private interests, and they start using regulation as a method of avoiding competition to 
maximize profits. Regulatory capture theory, mostly associated with Stigler, was initially 
developed as an alternative to public interest theory after the latter had been discredited 
(Hertog, 1999). Regulatory capture can be defined as regulators or regulatory agencies 
putting the interests of regulated industries ahead of the interests of the public or the 
consumers. This change in the regulator’s behavior tends to occur over a long time (i.e., 
as the regulators develop and mature, they become captured; Etzioni, 2009). There are 
several other categories of regulatory capture, as identified by Mitnick (2011), who 
argued that regulatory capture is more complex than what has been generally put forward. 
Mitnick stated, “It is a set of behavior pattern and relationships that can be produced in 
many ways, often acting in conjunction with one another” (p. 37). Mitnick suggested that 
there are six categories of capture, which I will discuss in the proceeding paragraphs 
(p. 37). 
Systemic Capture 
 The first category of capture as defined by Mitnick (2011) is systemic capture that 
takes place due to powers of certain interest groups propagating their interests in a 
manner that leads to bias by the regulatory institutions at the expense of other competing 
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interest groups. Interest groups have a tendency to strive for profit maximization, and one 
of the ways to do so is through influencing the regulatory process. However, some groups 
have more power than others, which leads to a misbalanced scale of competition. Truly 
democratic and pluralistic values can prevent this imbalance. Each group would consist 
of a small circle of active elites that would circulate instead of dominate due to consistent 
elections. However, in reality, power imbalances shield the interests of powerful interest 
groups. Generally, this phenomenon can be termed as imbalanced affective access 
politics, which leads to another form of systemic capture in the shape of subgovernmental 
institutionalization (Mitnick, 2011, p. 38). 
Various terms have been used to describe this phenomenon, including issue 
network and advocacy coalitions. These subgovernments often exhibit a state of capture, 
with consistent actions by stable power actors to align their interests together. “Iron 
triangle” is the term used for the outcome, in which legislatures, bureaucracies, and 
interest groups start reinforcing mutual interests in a cyclic manner. The formation of 
such iron triangles is detrimental for the regulatory process, as formal institutional lines 
start to vanish and the governance becomes virtual. It leads to outcomes and policies that 
safeguard only the interests of the regulated industry, which is usually the real capturing 
interest group. One example of such an iron triangle is the military industrial complex, 
consisting of defense contractors such as the Pentagon, the Congress, and the executive 
branch (Greenwald, 2012). 
Another form of systemic regulatory capture that Mitnick (2011) also identified is 
regulatory arbitrage (p. 39). Sometimes the mismatch between regulatory resources and 
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capabilities produces a space for regulated actors to use that space to their advantage. 
Examples include the banking sector, which is prone to regulatory arbitrage. Karolyi and 
Taboad (2015) stated that the large banks that operate globally can strategically choose 
their locations of operation, or engage in mergers and acquisitions where regulatory 
enforcement regimes are less strict and cheaper than their locations of origin (p. 1). Such 
activities can result in regulatory competition with “race-to-the-bottom” situations in the 
overall banking regulation, as well as threats to the international financial system. The 
acquiring bank has the opportunity to extract subsidies from the host regulator to pursue 
its weakly monitored activities (Hardy, 2006, p. 1). 
A method used globally to address the issue of imbalance between interest groups 
producing systemic capture is “proxy advocates” or “consumer advocates.” These are 
formal agents who represent the interests of those groups that lack the power to bias the 
regulatory system. In the United States, most of these institutions were established in the 
1970s to incorporate the feedback of utility consumers in legal and administrative 
proceedings. Consumer advocates argue on behalf of those consumers who are poorly 
organized to plead their case during regulatory hearings. One such group is residential 
utility consumers, whose membership numbers are much greater than those of industrial 
consumers, but their ability to collectively advocate for rights are much less. Through the 
efforts of consumer advocates, residential consumers were able to achieve lower rate 
rulings, and they resisted demands for raising utility tariffs (Holburn &Vanden Bergh, 
2006, p. 61). Effective consumer empowerment programs have led to win-win situations 
for both the consumers and businesses, as consumers can relish product safety while 
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businesses enjoy increased consumer trust (Wood, 2017, p. 650). Overall, according to 
Schwarz (2013), consumer advocacy institutions are helpful in balancing the power 
difference between different interest groups and preventing systemic regulatory capture 
(p. 44). 
Chronical Capture 
 A form of regulatory capture was observed in post-Communist states due to 
previous power imbalances. Highly centralized systems of governance were a source of 
these imbalances, negatively affecting the administrative and economic reforms that took 
place in the states and attempted to liberalize their economies during the 1990s. The 
outcomes of these impaired reforms led to the formation of state capture in which interest 
groups were able to hold the legislature, the executive offices, and the judiciary under 
their control. Laws and regulations were shaped to benefit a concentrated segment of 
regulated industries, which were able to draw monetary and political profits at the 
expense of smaller groups and the overall economy. Scholars have studied the dominance 
of the corporate sector that produced state capture in all of the European states with 
Communist inclinations (Mitnick, 2011, p. 45). 
Early policy choices made by these transitioning states into a crucial factor in 
deciding the fate of the entire regulatory reform process, as they had an irregularly high 
influence on the outcomes of reforms (Young, 2010, p. 3). Wrong choices in the early 
years of transition led to the foreclosure of certain options that were previously open. 
Policy choices made at the later stages had a lesser influence on the reform process, as 
they could not alter the path already adopted. Once an opportunity window was missed, 
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profiteering business interest groups were able to trap such transitioning nations into a 
vicious cycle. Young (2010) further argued that such an institutional capture had more 
detrimental consequences for the macroeconomic outlook of a country, when compared 
with the impacts of high-level corruption committed with the objective of one-time gains 
(p. 3). Institutional capture regularizes the imbalance by shaping the rules of business, 
benefitting the captors. 
Romania experienced state capture during the first 7 years of transition, in which 
the former Communist bureaucracy remained at the forefront, mainly due to their 
relationship with the ruling political parties (Vachudova, 2005, p. 50). The privatization 
of state entities on a broad scale without the due transparency process lay the ground for 
regulatory capture during the early years of transition. The Social Democratic Party 
dominated the Romanian power scene between 1990 and 1996, and again between 2000 
and 2004. Grodeland (2007) stated that during the days of Communism, a distinct form of 
political culture evolved in many such countries, including Romania, in which party 
secretaries had powers to handle issues of every type (p. 250). Later on, these public 
perceptions of party secretaries led to the belief that the problems that could previously 
be solved through contacts with party secretaries could now be solved through informal 
contacts with elected representatives. Interest groups made use of these informal 
networks for personal profits in situations where weak, contradictory, and excessive 
regulations did not allow legitimate outcomes to be achieved. Informal networks are 
defined as an “informal circle of people joining together with the intention of extracting 
benefits out of their association and to persist with this association over time” 
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(Grodeland, 2007, p. 220). Countries such as Bulgaria and Romania had more widespread 
usage of informal networks by regulated industries to achieve hidden ambitions. 
Klimina (2009) stated that since the early 1990s, researchers from various 
multilateral institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, have been applying the 
neoclassical institutionalist approach to research the patterns of a nexus between state 
capture, a weak institutional framework, and rent-seeking interest groups (p. 373). The 
causes of state capture in these states have been a history of undemocratic governments 
coupled with an institutionalized bias of incentive structure towards individualistic 
associations and inappropriate costs to rent-seeking, which ease the way for increased 
corruption. 
Relational Capture 
 Elected officials exert control over bureaucracies. This pattern of control is not 
limited to the appointments of officials and how the oversight proceedings of regulatory 
agencies are conducted, but extends to budgetary controls, forging the behavior of an 
agency, procedural manipulations, media coverage, influences from chief executives, 
altering the decision-making costs, and taking actions to affect the prominence of certain 
regulatory officials. The principal-agent model has been presented to explain the 
relationship between legislatures and heads of regulatory bodies. Now, for regulatory 
capture to occur, the agency must be able to go beyond this political clout and create an 
affiliation with the regulated industry that is based on a consistent bias towards the 
industry’s interests.  
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Getting reelected is a basic desire of any legislator, and for that purpose, electoral 
campaigning requires funds. Regulated industries can fund the electoral campaigns of 
influential politicians, especially those who oversee the working of regulatory agencies. 
Legislators are obligated to listen to these industries in their constituencies and help them 
by originating legislations that protect and promote their interests. On the other hand, 
regulators depend on legislators for the funding of their agencies, which are directly 
linked to their reputation as regulators. The regulated industry can affect their reputation 
by making direct complaints to legislators about their performance shortcomings 
(Mitnick, 2008, p. 1197). This type of relational governance works on the flow of 
incentives between the three corners of the iron triangle. 
The general target of any capturing entity is to install biased governance in place 
of a neutral governance. There are many methods to achieve this objective, including the 
usage of incentives to change the favors of the existing regulatory officials, using power 
to substitute unbiased managers with biased ones, changing the locations of regulators so 
that they are unable to detect regulatory violations, draining the human resources of an 
agency through forcing out regulators with technical expertise, and by shifting the control 
of regulation to other governments that lack enforcement capabilities due to their political 
sensitivities. 
Better employment prospects for any regulatory agency official can act as a 
catalyst for the capture of that agency. The regulated industry has an interest in human 
resources with in-depth knowledge of the industry and the right connections with 
influential persons in the legislature and allied bureaucracy. This need for regulatory 
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capital leads to the development of a “revolving door,” where regulated industries hire 
regulators with good repute to help them deal with the regulatory process. The incentives 
of lucrative employment opportunities for regulatory officials in the regulated industry 
can produce leniency in the regulations or utilities pricing procedures. Law and Long 
(2012) found that laws designed to curb this phenomenon through post government 
employment restrictions in various U. S. states did not reduce residential or commercial 
electricity prices, but did reduce industrial electricity prices for a short period of time, 
indicating that such laws can only temporarily slow down the process of regulatory 
capture (p. 434). Dal Bo (2006) also found that those commissioners appointed to the 
FCC that had a broadcasting industry background voted in favor of the industry on 
several occasions, illustrating how the revolving door works (p. 217). The revolving door 
is not limited to agency officials joining the regulated industry, but also includes 
congressional staffers being appointed as commissioners as a favor for their services to 
legislators. 
Functional Capture 
Regulators require information about industrial processes to perform their 
regulatory decision making. The regulated industry is considered to be the best source of 
that information. However, the industry has a tendency to filter the amount and quality of 
information reaching the regulator in accordance with their interests. The regulatory 
process can become captured if the information quality and interpretation is determined 




Excessive information can be fed in the disguise of transparency, making 
pluralistic participation difficult for smaller interest groups with fewer resources. Time-
consuming and costly regulatory processes (ie., hearings, briefings, public notice periods, 
etc.) create impediments for marginalized interest groups, while protecting the interests 
of incumbent firms already relishing the benefits of regulation. Purely legal systems may 
have the necessary safeguards against this “filter failure.” but administrative rule-making 
often lacks such mechanisms. Such a system that can place the deciding authority at the 
mercy of an unstoppable flow of information from an unopposed group, which also has 
the capability to strengthen its submissions by a litigation threat, is said to be captured by 
information (Mills & Koliba, 2014) 
The magnitude of regulatory capture increases with the degree of complexity and 
technicality involved in the information, as it can overwhelm an under resourced agency. 
One such example is that of the Minerals Management Service (MMS) in the wake of the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster. The agency was facing difficulties due to the complexities 
of deep-water drilling operations, as well as a lack of resources dedicated towards 
training and inspection functions (Wagner, 2010, p. 11). Drilling companies were 
involved in unsafe cost-cutting techniques, which could have been curbed if the MMS 
had inducted safety experts capable of making the required risk analysis. Overall, this 
informational disadvantage suffered by the agency allowed the regulated industry to 
proceed with their unsafe practices, leading to the catastrophic disaster. One of the 
methods that can be employed by regulatory agencies to reduce this informational 
disadvantage is the use of an incident reporting system where industry employees can 
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report regulatory violations in return for immunity and confidentiality (Wagner, 2010, p. 
17). 
Regulatory agencies benefit from the perceptions of their superior expertise in 
dealing with the complex technical affairs of the industries under their regulation. One of 
the basic motives behind the creation of regulatory bodies is that they will consist of 
permanent staff with expertise regarding the regulated industry that is missing in the 
legislature or judiciary, and that the regulatory body will enjoy public support due to this 
perceived strength. Such competency myths become mandatory for agencies working in 
resource-constrained environments, or in scenarios where multiple agencies regulate 
multiple aspects of an industry’s behavior. The hype surrounding the effectiveness of 
agencies helps to improve industry compliance, especially when credence goods are 
involved, for which customers lack the skills to assess their true utility. Carpenter (2013) 
argued that the Federal Drug Authority in the United States, which is mainly tasked with 
regulating the pharmaceutical industry, has thrived based on its superior reputation over 
time and has been able to accumulate power due to this quality. 
Individual Capture 
 Regulators working in different agencies have individualistic goals regarding their 
profession, apart from the usual objectives of their agencies. Such tendencies make these 
organizations a collection of unitary actors who act in a rational manner. Such 
individualistic aspirations are similar to those of legislators who intend to get reelected. 
Common assumptions about regulators include a hassle-free managerial life and lucrative 
employment opportunities once they leave the agency. Representatives of the regulated 
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industry try to incentivize agency officials to protect the interests of their industry. 
Influencers from the industry are assumed to be “perfect agents,” while regulators are not 
(Mitinick, 2011, p. 42). 
The outcome of this individualistic incentive model is the iron triangle, in which 
the interests of industries, regulators, and legislators are affiliated. Legislators need votes 
and money to get reelected. Regulated industries help them with campaign funds. In 
return, legislators serving on oversight committees facilitate the industry’s agenda. 
Legislators have an influence over regulators, as they have budgetary controls and can 
expose flaws in their management. Therefore, regulators are careful to cater to the 
preferences of legislators, or else they end up facing costly interventions that can hamper 
their individual and collective prospects. 
To regulate industries, regulators are in need of information about the industry. 
Regulators prefer to interact with industry officials to get the information they require for 
their own working, as most of the time it is costly to extract information by means other 
than from the industry itself. The industry is aware that having good relations with the 
regulators will help them during regulatory monitoring and evaluations. Reed (2009) 
argued that banks with less conflict with regulators, and a greater investment in the 
relationship with regulators, receive better evaluations (p. 171). Such banks with less 
negative attention from the regulators are able to invest their resources into other areas, 
helping them to improve their customer reputation in the market. Regulators start 
learning ways in which their regulatory capital can help them in the future, such as 
45 
 
working for the industry and dealing with the regulatory process themselves. This 
situation produces regulatory capture due to the circulation of individual incentives. 
Capture is further enhanced when a small set of regulators interacts with only a 
few firms in an industry, have been trained by the same industry, have fewer prospects of 
job promotion in their agencies, or are compensated poorly. Three types of patterns 
emerge from this individualistic analysis of regulatory capture. First, the regulators can 
be offered monetary incentives in the form of bribes. The second scenario involves a 
group of regulators facing resource constraints, short deadlines, and complex tasks; they 
are forced to maintain close relationships with industry personnel with whom they must 
meet to streamline regulatory processes, which leads to a reduction in the stringency of 
the regulatory enforcement. The third scenario revolves around the difficulties faced by 
regulators trained in the same industry having trouble extracting credible competing 
information about the industry. With the passage of time, all three scenarios lead to a 
situation in which the behaviors and attitudes of regulators become indistinguishable 
from the regulated industry individuals. Overall, the result is regulatory capture (Mitnick, 
2011, p. 42). 
Constitutional Capture 
Regulatory capture can emerge due to certain systemic biases, resulting in 
outcomes mainly due to biased laws, legislative actions, or other faulty regulations that 
produce benefits for interest groups at the expense of others. This effect complements the 
systemic capture or imbalanced affective access politics aspect where different interest 
groups have varying degrees of power to affect the regulatory process. The concept of 
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state capture also refers to the capturing of “rules of the games,” which were discussed 
under the chronical effects producing regulatory capture in post-Communist European 
states. 
Several researchers have studied the relationship between corruption and 
regulatory governance. Most of them focus on the conventional form of corruption, 
involving bribes being paid by private entities to public servants in order to fulfill the 
interests of their firms (Kauffman, 2004, p. 90). The public sector is not the only shaper 
of the investment outlook of a country. There is a complicated framework of 
reciprocation between the corporate and public sectors during the policy-making process, 
whereby influential regulated industrial sectors exert pressure to shape legislation, rules, 
and public policy forming the rules of the game and the business environment within 
which those sectors operate (Kauffman, 2005, p. 88). There is increasing focus on acts of 
corruption that may be legal in some countries, but are causing regulatory capture. Such 
acts stem from unbalanced playing fields, where laws and institutions have been shaped 
in a manner to protect vested interests. 
An example of such legal provisions that lead to corruption is the exploitation of 
legal loopholes to engage in political funding. Such funding can produce influence on 
policy-shaping institutions and regulatory agencies, helping the interests of contributing 
private bodies at the cost of larger public interests. Another example of such legal 
corruption is the favoritism observed during the procurement process conducted by the 
public or private sectors, in which there may be no involvement of illegal bribery but the 
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procurement rules lack transparency, and the level playing field may be absent 
(Kauffman, 2004, p. 90). 
The World Trade Organization 
The WTO is an international institution that seeks to regulate trade and liberalize 
various sectors of a country’s economy to facilitate easy trade between countries. It was 
created on February 15th, 1997, by 69 nations during the Uruguay Round of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations (WTO, 2014). The GATT was not 
as far-reaching or encompassing as the WTO, because it excluded trade in services, 
intellectual property, and technology. As part of the services agreement, 
telecommunications were among the first sectors to be regulated under the WTO 
guidelines. In addition to regulating trade, the WTO settles disputes between countries, 
monitors rules governing trade, and also facilitates capacity-building for less-developed 
countries (WTO, 2014). 
 Countries that committed to the WTO had to agree to the “Reference Paper,” 
which formed the guiding principles and definitions for the regulatory framework of the 
telecommunications sector. The countries had to guarantee interconnection between each 
other (i.e., the physical or logical linking of networks), employ anticompetitive 
precautions, and set up independent regulators (WTO, 2014). The WTO intentionally left 
out the definition of an independent regulator. The WTO’s only requirement concerning 
the regulator was that it should not be involved in the business of telecommunications 
(WTO, 2014). Historically, few governments of developing countries had any interest in 
telecommunications, except for the pricing of local services, and these governments 
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never linked this to any form of trade. The first telecommunications companies in the 
English-speaking Caribbean developing countries were self-regulated; they determined 
the quality of services they offered, allocated and licensed the radio frequency spectrum, 
and determined the prices for international services. However, with the respective 
governments complying with the WTO agreements, the companies now had to be 
subjected to government oversight. 
The WTO (2014) discovered that its developing country members had difficulties 
adhering to the WTO guidelines due to a lack of resources, including finances and 
qualified personnel (WTO, 2014). The WTO allowed special provisions and exceptions 
to these developing countries (e.g., longer time periods to implement agreements and 
commitments) and offered technical assistance from the WTO itself. Jawara and Kwa 
stated “developing countries were bullied and coerced into complying with agreements 
that most of them strongly disagreed with,” and that the benefits resulting from 
complying with the WTO’s guidelines were not felt by the developing countries (as cited 
in Staiger, 2009, pp. 2-3). Staiger (2009) concluded that the WTO was not equipped to 
handle small developing countries’ problems. Additionally, as Sampson and Chambers 
(2008) explained, after compliance, the only benefits arising from the free-trade that the 
developing countries could enjoy was in the long-term. In the short-term, however, the 
costs of structural adjustments and a loss of trade preferences were high; therefore, the 
developing countries required additional financial help, but the WTO could not provide 
them with monetary assistance (Sampson & Chambers, 2008). 
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Small Island Developing States and the World Trade Organization 
 Although the WTO was created with the objective of ensuring that all countries 
participate on one level, the problems faced by developing countries, such as those in the 
SIDS regions, concerning issues with trade agreements were difficult. Small economies 
faced challenges meeting their trade obligations because of their “lack of economies of 
scale, limited resources and high transport costs” (WTO, 2014, p. 1). Although there is 
still no single definition of SIDS, scholars associate the word small in SIDS with 
population size, the size of the country, and its economic activity as defined by the GDP. 
According to Read (2001), the idea of small continues to evolve in the literature, ranging 
from 10 to 15 million people; although, in the 1970s, the World Bank adopted 1 million 
as the upper end of small (Read, 2001). According to the World Bank (2013), small states 
share some distinct characteristics; among them are limited access to capital and income 
volatility. Also, from the perspective of the ECLAC (2000), the Caribbean SIDS, in 
particular, were vulnerable due to certain socioeconomic and natural characteristics, 
identified as follows: 
• Environmental/ecological vulnerability, particularly high exposure to natural, 
climatic catastrophes 
• Limited land resources and difficulties with waste disposal management 
• Geographic remoteness and isolation 
• Limited diversification and open economies 
• Weak institutional capacities and high costs of basic infrastructure 
• Special social vulnerabilities. (para. 5) 
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For this study, although not every one of these descriptors may be applicable, they 
were a reminder of the challenges facing SIDS. These vulnerabilities are not unique to 
SIDS; however, developing countries in general experience the same issues to varying 
degrees (ECLAC, 2000). 
Another difficulty SIDS face is the problem of good governance. Duncan and 
Chand stated that when educated persons control all aspects of the economy, ranging 
from the judiciary, to the police, the army and the senior bureaucracy, and are related 
through family ties or have gone to the same schools, then the idea of having checks and 
balances becomes difficult to implement (as cited in Ofa, 2012, p. 15). However, in spite 
of the challenges SIDS face, they can still prosper. As Ofa (2012) and Moreira and 
Mendoza (2007) explained, SIDS are not different from larger, more developed countries 
in their need for economic growth; therefore, they should be treated similarly to the larger 
countries. Although there are similarities with larger, developed countries with regards to 
growth, Ofa and the WTO (2013) concluded that SIDS must be treated in a special way 
regarding their policy reform processes. 
Telecommunications Reform 
Several factors drive telecommunications reform, also referred to as 
telecommunications liberalization. Chief among these are technological innovations, both 
in wireless and new data transmission techniques. With the onset of the Modified Final 
Judgment that went into effect in 1984, a U.S. court ordered telecommunications giant 
AT&T to break up into smaller entities. This breakup showed that the provision of 
telecommunications services no longer had to be within the domain of a single integrated 
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monopoly. Britain soon adopted this model; thereafter, regulators all over the world 
accepted the idea that competition in the telecommunications sector resulted in the 
provision of better quality services to customers, more investment, and more innovations 
(Intven et al., 2000). These reforms in the telecommunications sector led to more 
investment, which then led to both an improvement in the quality of the services offered 
and a lowering of the prices charged (Armstrong & Sappington, 2006; Wallsten, 2001). 
The key areas of telecommunications reform were privatization, the creation of an 
independent regulator, and competition (Li & Xu, 2004; Ofa, 2012; Wallsten, 2001, 
2002; Ros, 1997). Although it might be too early to tell whether the telecommunications 
reform within the Caribbean has been beneficial, there is evidence to suggest that the 
process has not achieved the levels of efficiencies, even within the European Union 
(Flacher, Jennequin & Ugur, 2009, Conclusion, para. 1). Flacher et al. (2009) suggested 
that the process of reform has largely ignored the “complex set of issues such as 
imperfect competition, imperfect information, and consequences that are likely to limit or 
prevent the achievement of efficiency and welfare gains” (p. 1). Telecommunications 
reform did not deal with the issues Flacher et al. discussed, and these issues are more 
prominent in smaller countries that do not have the economies of scale compared to 
larger, more developed countries. 
The number of independent telecommunications regulators in the world has 
grown. Wu (2004) analyzed the World Telecommunications Development Report and 
found that there were 13 independent regulators in 1990 (p. 4). However, in 2004, there 
were more than 100 established independent regulators, in order to meet obligations to 
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the WTO (Wu, 2004). Many researchers agree that independent regulators are necessary 
in order for countries to provide a degree of certainty to the sector (Levy & Spiller, 1994; 
Stern &Trillas, 2002; Wallsten, 2003). However, the literature only deals with regulators 
for large countries with large populations. For example, Brown, Stern, Tenenbaum, and 
Gencer (2006) stated that the primary reason a country should implement and justify 
economic regulation is if the regulation in question produces better sector outcomes. The 
country must perform better after implementing the regulatory reforms (Brown et al., 
2006). Good regulatory systems encourage economic growth (Jalilian, Kirkpatrick, 
Parker, & Centre on Regulation and Competition, 2006). Eberhard (2007) indicated that 
part of the telecommunications reform process involves the establishment of independent 
regulators. However, Eberhard also added that “mantras tend to substitute thinking – and 
may not always fit all settings” (p. 4). Eberhard stated that the best outcome for a proper 
regulatory framework is dependent on a country’s ability to commit the necessary 
institutional resources to it, and “to select from a menu of regulatory options to create 
hybrid models that best fit its own circumstances and challenges” (p. 1). In addition, 
Eberhard stated that “designing and implementing legitimate, competent regulatory 
institutions in developing countries will always be a dynamic challenge” (p. 1). 
Developing countries will continue to create these regulatory institutions, with varying 
degrees of independence, in order to meet their WTO obligations. 
Telecommunications Reform in the Caribbean 
Caribbean states have witnessed liberalization and competition growth in the 
telecommunications sector since the year 2000. Prior to the opening up of this sector to 
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new entrants, it was dominated by monopolizing companies that pitched their services to 
the elites instead of the mass market (Galperin & Mariscal, 2007). Cable & Wireless 
(C&W), a company operating within the British colonial framework, had exclusive rights 
under the Caribbean constitutional arrangement to provide telecommunication services 
across the majority of British Caribbean countries. National governments in those days 
did not have the technical expertise to contest the requests forwarded by C&W, and the 
perception developed that they rubber-stamped every proposal extended by the 
company’s management (Favaro & Winter, 2008). The telecommunications operators 
regulated themselves, with a modicum of national government involvement. 
Formation of Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority 
In addition to the pressure from the WTO, two events contributed towards the 
formation of a regional regulatory body in the form of the ECTEL. Marpin 
Telecommunications, getting the license to provide Internet services in Dominica, was 
the first one. In the beginning, Marpin provided its Internet services through leased lines 
acquired by C&W, but, in 1998, Marpin acquired an international gateway that bypassed 
C&W’s network. This caused resentment within the C&W management, and they 
decided to challenge Marpin’s move, citing their exclusive control over 
telecommunication resources, outlined by the Dominican law. After receiving several 
rulings in the lower judiciary, the case finally reached the highest court for all the East 
Caribbean nations (i.e., the Privy Council of the United Kingdom). The council ruled in 
favor of Marpin Telecommunications, stipulating that C&W’s monopoly was against the 
constitutional rights of the citizens (Abraham, 2010). 
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The second event that led to the regional unity required for the formation of a 
strong regional regulator was the confrontation between the St. Lucian government and 
C&W, in the year 2000. C&W made threats to withdraw to the St. Lucian government. 
This resulted in a common regional reaction against the C&W management. The 
governments of Grenada, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Dominica, and St. Kitts and 
Nevis stated that if C&W left St. Lucia, then the company would be forced to leave their 
territories as well. 
The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) played a role in the 
formation of ECTEL. OECS’s joint program with the World Bank, called the OECS 
Telecommunications Reform Project, helped pave the way for the creation of a regional 
regulator that would allow the liberalization of the overall telecommunications sector. 
ECTEL was created in May 2000, and it opened its headquarters in St. Lucia in 2002. It 
encompasses five members of the OECS, and it has become the world’s first multilateral 
telecom regulator (Plaidy et al., 2003). Each member state formulated the National 
Telecommunications Regulatory Commissions (NTRCs) by enacting the 
Telecommunication Acts. These NTRCs operate at national level, while ECTEL works at 
the regional level (Minges, Cross, & Gray, 2004). 
There are several benefits to having a multinational regulatory agency such as the 
ECTEL: Martin and Sohail (2005) stated, that it allows the development of a regulatory 
approach that can address “cross-cutting technical issues,” along with the provision of 
“high-level technical expertise common to all the member states” (p. 63). Greater 
investor confidence in the stability and objectivity of regulatory bodies will generate 
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more private investment. Despite several advantages of regional cooperation, there is a 
range of potential hurdles that can impede the integration process. These hurdles exist at 
the regional and national levels, and they include deteriorating political will, changes in 
integration strategies, technical lacunas, and national rivalries. Often, the integration 
process is undermined, as national interests start taking precedence over regional ones. 
This is especially true if member states are at varying levels of development and feel 
obstructed by the requirements of fewer countries (Lewis, 2000). 
The Eastern Caribbean Telecommunications Authority’s role is divided between 
the activities that it performs itself and the guidance it provides to contracting states. It is 
responsible for several different tasks, such as developing and maintaining an integrated 
radio plan, reviewing applications for licenses, designing and operating tender procedures 
for individual licenses, and coordinating with other organizations (Tremolet, Shukla, 
&Venton, 2004). Still, the bulk of its work is to provide guidance to contracting states 
related to technical standards, policy, and licensing issues (Tremolet, 2007). Overall, 
since ECTEL’s establishment, there has been a growth in competition in the mobile and 
fixed-line markets, which has led to lowered prices and increased investment. 
Jamaican Telecom Regulation and the Office of Utilities Regulation 
The OUR was established by the Office of Utilities Regulation Act, issued by the 
Jamaican government in order to regulate all major utilities in a collective manner. These 
utilities include telecommunications, electricity, water/sewerage, and transportation. 
Before that, C&W’s monopoly remained entrenched within Jamaican territory, especially 
in respect of the wired networks. There was a backlog of nearly 217,000 requests for 
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fixed-line telephone connections that C&W could not fulfill during the late 1990s. 
Internet service providers started offering phone calls over the Internet, which challenged 
C&W’s monopoly. Initially, C&W went into legal battle with the Jamaican government, 
but subsequently agreed to an out-of-court settlement. This agreement allowed the 
Jamaican government to promulgate the Telecommunication Act of 2000, replacing the 
1893 Act (Roberts-Brown & Golding, 2013). 
The Telecommunication Act of 2000 was instigated due to the WTO’s 
international pressure, as the Jamaican government is a signatory to the WTO and is 
bound by its decisions (Hillman & Braithwaite, 2004). This act helped to end C&W’s 
monopoly in the telecommunications sector, which stretched over decades. The 
Telecommunication Act of 2000 stipulated that entities in the telecommunications sector 
can be held accountable by the OUR to improve overall efficiency and service delivery. 
The enactment of the Fair Competition Act (FCA) in 1993 also helped with the 
liberalization of the telecommunications sector. The FCA protects the interests of the 
general public, through provisions directed against monopolistic tactics employed by the 
utilities and other companies. These highly anticompetitive practices include price-fixing, 
collusive tendering, and bid-rigging, all of which are harmful to the public interest 
(Hillman & Braithwaite, 2004). Jamaica adopted a multisector approach for regulating 
utilities through a single regulator. This approach is less costly compared with the 
approach of having a regulator for every utility sector. All the technical and 
administrative resources of the OUR are pooled, leading to cost reductions. 
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In the initial years of regulation, the single-sector approach may be more helpful 
in developing that regulator’s sector, but it can lead to regulatory capture due to increased 
interaction with the regulated industry. Jamaica’s multisector approach helps in this 
regard, as it checks misappropriations through closer scrutiny, reducing the chances of 
partial treatment. 
Caribbean Countries without Reform 
Despite the numerous reforms that have taken place throughout various islands, 
including the territories that are still controlled by the British, there are still a few island 
countries that have made no changes towards telecommunications reform or their 
regulatory frameworks. In Antigua and Barbuda, where the public utilities (water, 
electricity, and telecommunications) are still controlled by the government (APUA, 
2017), it has been challenging for them to introduce any kind of independent 
telecommunications regulator. It has almost become an annual routine for the various 
ministers of government to indicate that a change will occur, but, as of this writing, it is 
still outstanding (Daily Observer, 2014). It must be noted that Antigua and Barbuda 
introduced competition in the telecommunications sector via wireless, but the country has 
not introduced a new framework to govern the sector. 
The other country that, up until 2013, had not introduced an independent 
telecommunications regulator was Bermuda (Bermuda Regulatory Authority, 2017). 
Although it started the reform process back in 1986, the government still had direct 
oversight of the telecommunications sector. However, like Antigua and Barbuda, it had 
introduced competition in the sector, but delineated between the differing portions of 
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telecommunications services. Although there could be Internet Service Providers (ISP), 
they could not provide their own link to the home. A consumer in Bermuda would get 
two distinct bills: one from the ISP and the other from the company that provided the link 
between the consumer and the ISP. 
Summary 
Capture theory is used to explain the development, creation, and effectiveness of 
the telecommunications regulatory institutions or framework. In developing countries, a 
breakthrough in telecommunications is an opportunity for economic improvement. Social 
and cultural impacts brought about by telecommunications services are being felt. 
However, these advances can be threatened by the impact of regulatory capture (Stirton 
& Lodge, 2002). Regulatory capture, if it occurs, can have a negative impact on the 
telecoms sector. As Baudrier (2001) stated, capture of the regulator can occur due to 
“poor bureaucratic norms and incentives, lack or asymmetry of information” (p. 6). Galal 
and Nauriyal (1995) argued that regulatory regimes and the telecoms sector go hand in 
hand. Galal and Nauriyal posited that the telephone service provider’s performance is 
dependent on the credibility of the government, which in turn is dependent on certain 
safeguards that include an independent regulator. 
Regulatory capture theory also adds to the understanding of reforms in 
telecommunications institutions. Richter (2015) asserted that regulatory capture 
undermines public sector reforms, resulting in instability and mistrust by the public. 
Corruption has been cited as one of the reasons why the economic capture of a country’s 
regulatory agencies occurs. However, capture does not necessarily mean corruption 
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(Schacklock & Galtung, 2016). One example of capture can be seen in the case when 
Guyana’s Public Utilities Commission failed to grant the incumbent operator any rate 
increases, even after 14 years, in spite of the obligation pursuant to the license of the 
incumbent (Guyana Public Utilities Commission, 2015). However, the general elections 
of the country were held at the same time. The Public Utilities Commission preferred to 
lose credibility, rather than to embarrass the administration and have it be one of the 
causes for them losing the election. The Commission later revised its position without 
any further evidence and at the same incumbent’s request (Guyana Public Utilities 
Commission, 2017).  
Scholars have advocated for the creation and development of independent 
regulatory reforms throughout the English-speaking Caribbean countries. There are 
several factors that affect how scholars view regulation. These factors are not only 
explained by using theoretical models, but also through the study of historical 
evolutionary processes. 
Because the majority of the island states are former colonies of Great Britain, they 
have a tendency to mimic their former colonial master. Despite this tendency, there are 
unique natural geographic and socioeconomic features that set them apart from each 
other. Because the island states predominantly depended on agriculture, they were slow 
to recognize the impact of ICTs and to adopt any telecommunications reform processes. 
Therefore, moving from a monopoly-based telecommunications environment to a 
competitive one required the external influence of the WTO. Although these countries 
adopted WTO principles, they did this not to enhance their ICT sectors, but to increase 
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and protect their own agricultural outputs, because the WTO could not protect their other 
trade interests if they did not open up their telecommunications markets. 
Once the English-speaking Island states of the Caribbean realized the benefits that 
could be gained from implementing the WTO principles, many did so, because they had 
already begun the reform process, starting with privatization. Soon after the Caribbean 
countries began developing independent regulatory agencies, the WTO recognized that 
both developing countries and SIDS needed special considerations regarding the 
implementation of its rules. While some of these countries forged ahead with setting up 
independent regulatory agencies, others slowed the process down or simply failed to set 
them up, and instead chose to follow the WTO guidelines by ensuring the regulatory 
entity was separated from the telecommunications sector by creating distinct, unrelated 
regulatory ministries. As identified by Jordana, Levi-Faur, and Marin (2011), regulatory 
agencies have grown and developed through an “global diffusion” process by changes 
that have occurred in the bureaucracies, policy-making, and the roles of the state, 
resulting in changes that are yet to be completely understood (Jordana et al., 2011, p. 19). 
In the Eastern Caribbean (i.e., Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, 
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines), countries created the ECTEL treaty (2013). This is a 
regulator similar to their Eastern Caribbean Central Bank. At the same time, they also 
created a local regulator, the NTRC. The only country in the Eastern Caribbean that did 
not sign the treaty and still remained a member of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank 
was Antigua and Barbuda. The only other country that did not create an independent 
regulator at the time others in the region did so was Bermuda, but it did so in 2012 
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(Bermuda Regulatory Authority, 2014). All the other Caribbean countries created single, 
impartial, independent regulators. 
A country’s decision to adopt a new telecommunications regulatory policy reform 
or framework is based on several factors. Developing a telecommunications regulatory 
policy is difficult, because social and cultural norms come into play, combined with 
political will. In addition, what other countries are doing is important, and so too are the 
wishes of the public (Berry & Berry, 1999). Developing states are under the influence of 
the larger, more developed countries, because they have a stronghold on agencies such as 
the WTO. SIDS, such as those of the English-speaking Caribbean, have difficulty 
following these agencies’ policies. Countries that make up SIDS have not had a choice 
with regards to independent telecommunications regulation; they have been forced to 
adopt a regulatory model created by others. However, the regulatory theory discussed in 
this literature also helps to explain telecommunications reforms and the speed with which 
they are implemented. 




Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to discover the impact that the creation of 
independent telecommunications regulators has on SIDs of the Caribbean. Scholars have 
focused on the importance of regulators in general, but have not focused on regulators in 
SIDS. As Ofa (2012) explained, the telecommunications reform of the small developing 
island countries gained credibility once the countries signed on to the WTO, which 
mandated the inclusion of independent regulators in the sector as part of 
telecommunications reform (p. 23).   
Wallsten (2002) found that telecommunications reform that included competition 
and independent regulatory bodies had the greatest economic benefits to a country, even 
more so than privatization and regulation (p. 6). Additionally, Galal and Nauriyal (1995), 
Hoffman (2008), and Mohamad (2014) found that in some countries, telecommunications 
reform was implemented, but in others, it failed. Scholars recognized that SIDS do not 
necessarily need the same factors in place to have the same kind of economic growth that 
the larger countries do. Researchers have not studied SIDS as they pertain to 
telecommunications regulatory reform, and research on telecommunications regulatory 
reform does not distinguish between larger states and SIDS. Dhaher (2011) stated,  
telecommunications regulatory frameworks in large states do not take the 
economic characteristics of small states under consideration, which resulted in 
problems with regard to market structure and competition and a higher cost of 
implementing regulations compared to their benefits. (p. 2).  
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Additionally, Dhaher pointed out that both “lack of experience” and “weak institutional 
experience” had an adverse effect on any reform (p. 2).  
Technology is a determinant of growth. New technologies reduce the prices of 
goods and services to which they are applied. They also lead to the creation of new 
products. Consumers benefit from these improvements, regardless of whether they live in 
rich or poor countries (Rodrik, 2018). Competition along with leapfrogging technologies 
like mobile telephony, local wireless loops, and mobile banking all have potential impact 
on economic development. The ability to access and adapt technologies enables social 
inclusion for the poor to escape the economic stratification in lesser developed countries 
(Warschuer, 2004, p. 8). 
In order to answer the overarching question regarding the impact of independent 
telecommunications regulatory bodies, I asked the following questions: 
1. How are telecommunications infrastructure in fixed line services affected by 
regulatory regime, population, telecommunications investment, competition in the 
telecoms sector, GDP/income per capita and telephone tariffs?  
H01: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, competition in the telecoms 
sector, and telephone tariffs do not have any effect on the dependent variable fixed line 
services. 
H11: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, competition in the telecoms 
sector, and telephone tariffs do affect the dependent variable fixed line services. 
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2. How are telecommunications infrastructure in cellular services affected by 
the regulatory regime, population, telecommunications investment, competition in the 
telecoms sector, GDP/income per capita and telephone tariffs? 
H02: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, competition in the telecoms 
sector, and telephone tariffs do not have any effect on the dependent variable cellular 
services. 
H12: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, competition in the telecoms 
sector, and telephone tariffs do affect the dependent variable cellular services. 
3. How are telecommunications infrastructure in universal services (i.e., 
fixed lines and cellular services) affected by the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, competition in the telecoms sector, GDP/income per 
capita and telephone tariffs? 
H03: The independent of regulatory regime, population, telecommunications 
investment, GDP/income per capita, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone 
tariffs do not have any effect on the dependent variable universal services. 
H13: The independent of regulatory regime, population, telecommunications 
investment, GDP/income per capita, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone 
tariffs do affect the dependent variable universal services. 
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4. What is the relationship between prices in the telecoms sector (telephone 
tariffs) and the regulatory regime, population, telecommunications investment, 
competition in the telecoms sector, GDP/income per capita? 
H04: Independent variables of the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, and competition in the telecoms 
sector do not have any effect on the dependent variable prices. 
H14: Independent variables of the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, and competition in the telecoms 
sector do affect the dependent variable prices. 
5. What is the relationship between telecoms investment and the regulatory 
regime, population, telecommunications prices, competition in the telecoms sector, and 
GDP/income per capita? 
H05: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, and competition in the telecoms 
sector do not have any effect on the dependent variable telecoms investment. 
H15: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, and competition in the telecoms 
sector does affect the dependent variable telecoms investment. 
6. What is the relationship between broadband usage and the regulatory 
regime, population, telecommunications prices, competition in the telecoms sector, and 
GDP/income per capita? 
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H06: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, and competition in the telecoms 
sector do not have any effect on the dependent variable broadband usage. 
H16: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP/income per capita, and competition in the telecoms 
sector do affect the dependent variable broadband usage. 
7. What is the relationship between competition in telecoms sector and 
regulatory regime, population, telecommunication prices, and GDP/income per capita? 
H07: No relationship exists between independent variables of regulatory regime 
population, telecommunication prices, and GDP/income per capita. 
H17: No relationship exists between independent variables of regulatory regime 
population, telecommunication prices, and GDP/income per capita. 
Research Design 
Scholars define the term independence in several ways; I, however, examined 
purely statutory independence that is defined as “the operational separation of the 
regulator from the government and from those it regulates” (Mohammed & Strobl, 2010, 
p. 96). This definition is accepted throughout the telecommunications industry.    
The WTO Agreement on Basic Telecommunications defined an independent 
regulator as an entity that is separate only from the incumbent operator. However, 
according to Nikolinakos (2006), the European Open Network Provision Framework 
Directive has a different definition. Independence is to “create seamless interoperability 
of services between interconnected networks” (Nikolinakos, 2006, p. 50). The European 
67 
 
Open Network informed its member states that, in retained ownership in 
telecommunications services or networks, there must be a structural separation between 
the entities providing such services and the national regulatory authority (Kirkham & 
Swaminathan, 1996). Throughout the English-speaking Caribbean, whenever 
governments use the term independent telecommunications regulator, they are referring 
to a corporate body established through legislative process; therefore, the corporate body 
fits both the WTO and the European Union recommendations. 
In this study, I measured the impact of independent and nonindependent 
regulators, tariffs, universal services, broadband usage, GDP per capita, and telecoms 
investment and competition on various aspects of the telecommunications sector. The 
hypothesis was that countries that do introduce an independent regulator and competition 
into the telecommunications sector have performed better in terms of infrastructure 
deployment (i.e., universal services), telecoms tariffs, and telecoms investment. Figure 1 




Figure 1. A diagram of how countries choose a regulatory framework and the 




Governments adopt certain policies because states have a tendency to follow each 
other, especially when they are ideologically similar (Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, & 
Peterson, 2004). However, the adoption of a policy is also based on the pressures the 
government faces at any given time. Whether an English-speaking Caribbean country 
adopts a particular telecommunications regulatory framework is determined by several 
factors, including what its neighboring countries are doing and the perceived internal and 
external pressures that it may be facing. The country has to decide whether it will 
establish an independent or nonindependent regulator, which has implications on the 
telecommunications sector and the economy. I employed a quantitative, experimental 
design. This design was appropriate because of the research questions, essentially testing 
the importance of the independent regulator and its impact on the telecommunications 
sector as described by the telecommunications infrastructure (fixed and cellular services), 
telecoms investment, and so forth.  
Methodology 
The methodological approach primarily included a cross-sectional, time-series 
analysis to compare the countries that operate under differing regulatory frameworks. 
This design was appropriate because as Sayrs (1989) suggested, “pooling is 
useful…when length of the time series is abbreviated and/or the sample of cross-sections 
is modest in size” (p. 7). The purpose of this approach was to measure the effects that 
independent regulatory institutions, as previously defined, have on the 
telecommunications sector in small English-speaking Caribbean countries and to attribute 
any changes to the type of regulatory system in place. The sample of countries is small, 
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yet encompasses all of the countries in the English-speaking Caribbean. These countries 
are dissimilar with respect to factors such as their GDP or their income per capita and 
their telecommunications sector.   
The specification of the model for my econometric analysis is from the theory 
described in Chapter 2.   
Dependent variable=b0+b1*Independent regulator+b2*Competition+b3*other country 
effects + error 
Equation 1 
In these equations, independent variables were tariffs, investments, and so forth. 
There were three models to test the hypothesis of an independent regulator being 
a necessary factor in telecoms infrastructure deployment (dependent variable). The first 
model was where the telephones in services would be fixed lines in services. This has 
been the standard model. However, the second model included only cellular service, and 
the third model was a composite variable (i.e., the sum of cellular and fixed lines 
services). 
Log (Telephones in service)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulatory 
regime)it +  b3 log (tariffs)it + b4 log (telecoms investment)it +  b5 log (income per capita)it 
+ b6 (competition)it  + ε 
Equation 2 
The composite variable represented the level of telecommunications penetration 
or the accessibility of telephones throughout the countries. It was the sum of the fixed 
telephones in service and the amount of cellular subscribers. 
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The next variable was the regulatory variable, which was a binary regressor. This 
measured whether there was an independent regulator in the country or whether the 
regulator is a part of a ministry (nonindependent). Generally, this measure indicated that 
a greater level of penetration occurs with an independent regulator; hence, the coefficient 
of the sign will be positive. 
The tariff variable was one of the average prices for service relative to the other 
countries. Although it may be difficult to create a single index, the ITU has created an 
ICT price basket that I used as a proxy to develop this tariff variable. The ICT price 
basket includes both fixed and mobile telephone and fixed broadband service (ICT Data 
& Statistical Division, 2012). I expected that the coefficient of this variable will be 
positively related to growth in the sector. 
The other critical variable was the telecommunications regulator, which was 
independent of any ministerial portfolio of the government. In the Caribbean, prior to the 
creation of the regulator, the ministry had general oversight of the industry, and a 
permanent secretary within the ministry oversaw operations while the minister generally 
oversaw policies or critical and politically sensitive matters such as tariffs. Also, in the 
Caribbean, there was no differentiation between functional or statutory independence 
because such independence was already established via statute or legislative fiat for all 
the countries that created a regulator. Although it may be possible to create degrees of 
independence of countries based on some qualitative factors, doing so would result in an 
arguable and controversial scale. Therefore, I made independence one-dimensional in 
order to ensure a total capture of the nature of this variable. In using this approach, more 
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refined issues of the regulatory design were not be captured (ie., a single regulator as 
opposed to a commission of regulators could impact the telecommunications sector 
differently). However, the variable was independence as defined by statute or 
nonindependence, meaning it resides solely within the responsible ministry of the 
government.    
Another binary variable had to be introduced for the country of Monserrat 
because of a volcano that destroyed half the island in 1995, and from which it has never 
fully recovered. 
The final variable, competition, was also another binary variable. This 
measurement indicated when competition in the telecommunications sector was 
introduced into the respective country.   
There were also four other models that were employed to test the significance of 
the independent regulator (IR); these were also be cross-sectional pooled time series 
model. The models were as follows: 
The first tested if prices (tariffs) in the telecoms sector are affected by IR from 
theory. 
Equation 3 
Log (prices in the telecoms sector)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 
(regulatory regime)it +  b3 log (infrastructure deployment i.e. composite variable)it + b4 
log (telecoms investment)it +  b5 log (income per capita)it + b6 (competition)it  + ε 




Log (telecoms investment)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulatory 
regime)it +  b3 log (tariffs)it + b4 log (infrastructure deployment i.e. composite variable)it +  
b5 log (income per capita)it + b6 (competition)it  + ε 
The third model tested broadband usage and IR. 
Equation 5 
Log (Broadband usage)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulatory 
regime)it +  b3 log (tariffs)it + b4 log (telecoms investment)it +  b5 log (income per capita)it 
+ b6 (competition)it+b7 log (infrastructure deployment i.e. composite variable)it + ε 
The fourth and final model tested competition and IR. 
Equation 6 
 Log (competition)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulatory 
regime)it +  b3 log (tariffs)it + b4 log (infrastructure deployment i.e. composite variable)it +  
b5 log (income per capita)it + b6 (telecoms investment)it  + ε 
Data Description 
The primary data analyzed for this study included panel data from the ITU, on 18 
English speaking countries from the Caribbean and Latin American region, covering the 
period from 1993 to 2012. Panel data, also referred to as longitudinal data or cross-
sectional time-series data, are a type of pooled data that may contain both cross-section 
(i.e., data on one or more variables collected at a single point in time) and time series 
(data that are collected over a time interval [ie., weekly, quarterly or annually]). For 
example, if there are 10 years of annual data for 17 different countries, using panel data, 
there would be 170 observations. According to Paul (n.d.), there are several reasons for 
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using panel data including mitigating against the challenges of resulting from parameter 
heterogeneity and selectivity bias: 
1. Because the panel data relate to factors such as individuals, firms, states, 
and countries, over time, the presence of heterogeneity in these units is a natural 
phenomenon. The techniques of panel data estimation take such heterogeneity into 
account by allowing for individual variables. 
2. By combining time series of cross section observations, panel data give 
“more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees 
of freedom and more efficiency.” 
3. By studying the repeated cross section of observations, panel data are 
better suited to study dynamics of change. 
4. Panel data can better detect and measure effects that cannot be observed in 
pure cross section or time series data. 
5. Panel data enables researchers to study more complicated behavioral 
models. 
6. By making data available for several thousand units, panel data minimize 
the bias that might result when researchers aggregate individuals or firms into broad 
aggregates. (pp. 1-2)    
Analytical Framework 
The number of mobile and fixed telephone lines was compared by groups based 
on competition and IRs using independent samples to test to see whether there was a 
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significant difference between these groups. In order to control for possible confounding 
factors, and given the panel structure of the data, I fit the regression models in the form: 
Equation 7 
x βit it i ity uα ε= + + +  
 
In this model, y was the dependent variable, xit was the vector of independent 
(explanatory) variables, i itu ε+ was the error term in which I had minimal interest. I 
wanted estimates of β  - parameter estimates vector. iu was the unit-specific (in this 
case, state-specific) error term: it differed between units, but for any particular unit, its 
value was constant. This error component captured all individual country effects that 
were country-specific, but time-invariant (e.g., propensity of people to adopt innovations, 
historical and institutional factors for countries that might influence telecommunication 
market, etc.).  
 OLS regressions were estimated with country dummy variables among 
independent variables so that each country’s unobserved influence on the dependent 
variable was accounted for. It was important to include these country-specific effects to 
avoid biased estimates of the key parameters of interest (the coefficients of competition 
and independent regulator dummy variables). 
 Robust standard errors (Huber/White/sandwich variance–covariance matrix 
estimator) of the coefficients that are identical to those obtained by clustering on the 
panel variable state were reported. Clustering on the panel variable produces an estimator 
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that is robust to cross-sectional heteroscedasticity and within-panel (serial) correlation 
that is asymptotically equivalent to that proposed by Arellano (1987). 
 The fraction of error variance that was attributed to ui (i.e., to country-specific 
effects) was also reported. The larger this proportion was, the higher the importance of 
country-specific unobserved heterogeneity that was, however, accounted for by the fixed 
effects model. 
 Double log specifications were used, common in related literature, leaving only 
dummy variable untransformed. In logy = a+bx specification b is interpreted as follows: 
“when x goes up by 1, y increases by (exp(b)-1)*100%”. 
Essentially, two different approaches–the fixed effects model or the random 
effects model–were applicable to this research. The model a researcher selects depends 
on the available data and his or her belief about the models. For example, Kennedy 
(1998) argued that fixed and random effects models are usually used “when the number 
of cross-sectional units is large and the number of time periods over which those units are 
observed is small” (p. 231). However, as to the exact choice of models, Clark and Lizner 
(2012) and Borenstein et al. (2009) stated that how a researcher determines which model 
is best remains unclear because scholars give contradictory advice (p. 29). If a researcher 
is unsure of what model to use, he or she should administer the recommended Hausman 
specification test in order to “test for orthogonality of the common effects and the 
regressors” (Greene, 2008, p. 208). However, both Greene (2008) and Clark and Lizner 
(2012) agreed that the Hausman test is not a reliable tool for identifying bias nor does it 
give any further information as to the balance of bias and variance between the two 
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modelling approaches. However, it is the least complicated of the tests than can be run to 
give the experimenter some guidance.  
According to Borenstein et al. (2009) scholars generally use the fixed-effect 
model when “all studies in the analysis are functionally identical and the goal is to 
compute the common effect size for the identified population, and not to generalize to 
other populations” (p. 83). Hsiao (2003) also suggested that a fixed-effects model is best 
when the observations in an experiment are not randomly sampled but are all available 
and used. The use of the fixed effects is also based on the belief or assumption that the 
omitted variables effects are correlated with the variables that are included within the 
equation (Greene, 2008).   
A fixed model includes dummy variables within the equation to control for both 
the unobservable and observable differences that could reduce the omitted variable bias. 
Simultaneously, changes in time in the unobservable variables should not correlate with 
the included variables; if so, then the omitted variable bias would still be present. The 
impact of each of the predictor variables is assumed to be exact across all the groups, and 
the regression equation reports only the average of the within-group effects. Finally, in 
order for the fixed-effects model to be successful,  
each individual in the sample must have two or more measurements on the same 
dependent variable, and [on] at least some of the individuals in the sample, the 
values of the independent variable(s) of interest must be different on at least two 
of the measurement occasions. (Allison, 2005, p. 2)   
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Interaction of Variables 
The interaction of variables sometimes occurs whenever there is a combined 
effect on the dependent variable. The effect of one policy variable could change 
whenever it is implemented at the same time as another policy. In this study, the 
dependent variables were the implementation of an IR and the introduction of 
competition into the telecommunications sector, and the two were dummy variables. If 
these two variables interacted with each other, it would have a significant implication and 
it would be difficult to determine how best to interpret the results. A two-way interaction 
term needed to be created to test the interaction of both the IR and competition. An F-
statistic test should be undertaken to determine if the coefficients on the interaction terms 
together equal 0. The null hypothesis was that if there is no difference between the 
interaction variables, the test will result in a significant F-statistic. This is applicable to 
the regression coefficients, which is generally in the parameter estimates table, and not to 
the analysis of variance (ANOVA) table, although “the same principles apply to the 
interpretation of the results in the ANOVA” (Taylor, 2007, p. 1). 
Policy makers, while tending to be conservative by nature, usually try to meet a 
series of social objectives (for example, allowing cross subsidies and universal service) in 
order to maximize social welfare for the population. Policy makers expect the 
introduction of both competition and the IR will increase the efficiency of service, lower 
prices, and increase universal service. Therefore, I expected that the interaction of these 




Generally, research is limited by data that are available, and this reality is true for 
developing countries. Comparable data were not available for all the variables and all the 
countries. To compensate for the missing data, contact was made with the individual 
governments and regulatory bodies to acquire the required information. However, in the 
instances where governments or private entities could not provide data, the model was 
not be affected. I analyzed the panel as unbalanced and assumed the missing data were 
random; therefore, the results can still be generalized. 
Threats to Validity 
 Internal validity refers to the confidence a scholar has in the experiment and that 
the relationship between the variables that was established is indeed causal (Shuttleworth, 
2009). Although it is not possible to completely eliminate threats to internal validity, a 
researcher can minimize those threats. Trochim and Donnelly (2007) suggested that three 
conditions must be met before a scholar can conclude that there exists “a cause and 
relationship” (p. 232). These conditions are covariation, temporal precedence, and no 
plausible alternative explanations (Trochim & Donnelly, 2007). In establishing that there 
is no other explanation that can be concluded, telecommunications are one of those 
utilities that is subject to technological innovation. During the last decade, the industry 
has evolved from wired to wireless platforms, which required significant technological 
shifts (ITU, 2004). Tullock, Seldon, and Brady (2005) suggested that shifts are also a 
result of factors including legislative and technological changes. However, although there 
may be some conflating of results with technology, the advent of an IR may contain the 
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impact. I assumed that technological changes were constant across all the examined 
countries because the same telecommunications company exists in nearly all of the 
examined countries. Consequently, the impact of the causal effect of technology on the 
industry could be safely eliminated. The need to establish legislation and implement 
legislative changes is responsible for the creation of IRs. With IRs, changes in legislation 
have little to no impact. Hence, I am confident that this investigation was internally 
consistent and valid. 
 External validity is the ability to generalize the results of the findings (Trochim & 
Donnelly, 2007). The data from this investigation concerned only English-speaking 
countries of the Caribbean; as such, the data should not be used to predict outcomes for 
other jurisdictions. Thus, I did not claim external validity. There are too many other 
socioeconomic and cultural differences that could have an impact on other countries’ 
results. 
Ethical Procedures 
 The data that were obtained were available from public sources including Internet 
sites, regulatory institutions, and companies that collect the data. I did not imperil the 
privacy, safety and welfare rights of any person from institutions that provided me with 
the information. The same information could be obtained from the various institutions 
upon request. The data obtained may be manipulated in ways such as being aggregated to 
address the questions in the study. The data were archived on a personal computer and 
were publicly accessible. There were no human subjects that were involved in the 
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quantitative research design. I ensure that I received institutional review board approval 
before proceeding with study.  
Summary 
In this chapter, I introduced the theoretical framework and the research design the 
analysis was built on, the policy variables, and the description of the various variables 
that were used in the analysis. I outlined the relationship between the IR/independent 
framework and various elements generally associated with the development of the 
telecoms sector, and specifically in the English-speaking Caribbean. The theoretical 
framework in which the relationship of the regulator was examined was capture theory. I 
also described the data and the inherent drawbacks of using said data. In addition, I 
explained the methodology of cross-sectional pooled fixed-effects model and the 
argument in support of this model. Based on the information presented, I chose the 
correct econometric analysis and technique, and the research design is adequate to answer 
the research questions.  
In Chapter 4, I will present the results of the panel data models along with all the 




Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the quantitative study. I 
assessed the impact of an IR or framework on the telecommunications sector of the 
English-speaking Caribbean. There were seven questions that were used to make a 
determination about the impact of the independent regulator and they are as follows: 
1. How are telecommunications infrastructure in fixed line services affected 
by regulatory regime, population, telecommunications investment, competition in the 
telecoms sector, GDP and telephone tariffs?  
H01: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone 
tariffs do not have any effect on the dependent variable fixed line services. 
H11: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone 
tariffs do affect the dependent variable fixed line services. 
2. How are telecommunications infrastructure in cellular services affected by 
the regulatory regime, population, telecommunications investment, competition in the 
telecoms sector, GDP and telephone tariffs? 
H02: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone 
tariffs do not have any effect on the dependent variable cellular services. 
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H12: The independent variables of regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone 
tariffs do affect the dependent variable cellular services. 
3. How are telecommunications infrastructure in universal services (i.e., 
fixed lines and cellular services) affected by the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, competition in the telecoms sector, GDP and telephone 
tariffs? 
H03: The independent of regulatory regime, population, telecommunications 
investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone tariffs do not have 
any effect on the dependent variable universal services. 
H13: The independent of regulatory regime, population, telecommunications 
investment, GDP, competition in the telecoms sector, and telephone tariffs do affect the 
dependent variable universal services. 
4. What is the relationship between prices in the telecoms sector (telephone 
tariffs) and the regulatory regime, population, telecommunications investment, 
competition in the telecoms sector, GDP? 
H04: Independent variables of the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do not 
have any effect on the dependent variable prices. 
H14: Independent variables of the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do affect 
the dependent variable prices. 
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5. What is the relationship between telecoms investment and the regulatory 
regime, population, telecommunications prices, competition in the telecoms sector, and 
GDP? 
H05: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do not 
have any effect on the dependent variable telecoms investment. 
H15: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector does affect 
the dependent variable telecoms investment. 
6. What is the relationship between broadband usage and the regulatory 
regime, population, telecommunications prices, competition in the telecoms sector, and 
GDP? 
H06: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do not 
have any effect on the dependent variable broadband usage. 
H16: The independent variables of the regulatory regime, population, 
telecommunications investment, GDP, and competition in the telecoms sector do affect 
the dependent variable broadband usage. 
7. What is the relationship between competition in telecoms sector and 
regulatory regime, population, telecommunication prices, and GDP? 
H07: No relationship exists between independent variables of regulatory regime 
population, telecommunication prices, and GDP. 
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H17: No relationship exists between independent variables of regulatory regime 
population, telecommunication prices, and GDP. 
Data Collection 
The data were collected and analyzed as indicated in Chapter 3. The dependent 
variables were fixed lines, cellular lines, a universal service (i.e., summary of both 
cellular and fixed lines), prices of the telecoms services, telecoms investment, broadband 




Table 2  
Variables Names, Characteristics and Source of the Data 





State Name of Country 18 0  
Year 
 
20 0  
GDP_USD  GDP in US dollar, constant 2010 prices 360 0 UN Data 
GDP_Capita GDP per capita 360 0 UN Data 
Population Population of Country 359 1 ITU 
Fixed_Tel Number of Main telephone lines (fixed lines) in 
operation 
341 19 ITU 
Fixed_Tel_100 Number of Main telephone lines (fixed lines) in 
operation per 100 persons 
341 19 ITU 
Fixed_Install Residential telephone connection charge (US$) 211 149 ITU 
Fixed_Sub Residential monthly telephone subscription (US$) 219 141 ITU 
Mobile_Tel Number of mobile telephones in operation 317 43 ITU 
Mobile_Tel_100 Number of mobile telephones in operation per 100 
persons 
317 43 ITU 
Mobile_Install Mobile cellular connection charge (US$) 183 177 ITU 
Mobile_Sub Mobile cellular monthly subscription (US$) 168 192 ITU 
Mobile_Min Mobile cellular – price of 3-minute local call (peak – 
US$) 
215 145 ITU 
Total_Sub Total telephone subscribers (includes fixed and 
mobile) 
343 17 ITU 
Internet_100 Number of internet users per 100 persons 274 86 ITU 
Total_Invest Total annual investment in telecom (US$) 111 249 ITU 
Regulator Binary variable indicating the presence of an 
independent regulator 
360 0  
Regulator_Lag Binary variable indicating the presence of an 
independent regulator at lag one 
360 0  
Competition Binary variable indicating the presence of 
competition 
360 0  
Volcano Binary variable indicating effects of a volcano 
present 
360 0  
Note. *ITU = International Telecommunication Union 
 
To compensate for the largeness of some of my variables, relative to others in the 





 I present the results of each of the equations in the order of the questions. A 
transformation of the data occurred using a log-log equation that helped in decreasing the 
variability and have it conform more closely to a normal type distribution. For Research 
Question 1, Tables 3 and 4 present the model. 
Equation 7 
Log (fixed_tel)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulator)it +  b3 log 
(fixed_install)it + b4 log (fixed_sub)it + b5 log (total_invest)it +  b6 log (GDP_ capita)it + 






Variable Estimate Std Error t-value Pr (>|t|) 
Intercept -3.326** 5.683 -5.899 7.83 
Population 5.199** 1.048 4.961 1.50 
Regulator 2.749** 1.220 2.253 0.030094 
Fixed Install 
Price 
9.574** 3.738 2.561 0.014514 
Fixed_Sub -3.202** 1.560e+04 -2.052 0.047059 
Total_Invest -3.301 6.513 -0.507 0.615151 
GDP 2.937** 5.223 5.625 1.86 
Competition 1.118 1.457 0.767 0.447884 





Model 1 Multicollinearity Test 
Variable         VIF 
Population  1.466209** 
Regulator   6.545489** 
Fixed_Install  3.685174** 
Fixed_Sub   4.752718** 
Total_Invest   8.622352** 
GDP      4.517927** 
Competition   7.308518** 
Note. ** significant 
 The residual standard error: 19900 on 38 degrees of freedom the adjusted R-squ
ared: 0.9801,F-statistic: 103.5 on 35 and 38 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16 
 It must be noted that the null hypothesis was rejected. Penn State Science 
(2018) stated, 
The variance inflation factors for a regression model measures the variance of  
the estimated regression coefficient bk is ‘inflated’ by the existence of correlation 
among the predictor variables in the model. A VIF of 1 means that there is no 
correlation among the kth predictor and the remaining predictor variables, and 
hence the variance of bk is not inflated at all. The general rule of thumb is that 
VIFs exceeding 4 warrant further investigation, while VIFs exceeding 10 are 
signs of serious multicollinearity requiring correction. (p. 8)  
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Based on the model results, the independent variables were highly collinear with 
each other. Although this would present an issue if the model was being used for 
forecasting, the inclusion of variables tended to follow each other, such as income per 
capita and population and competition and the introduction of the regulator. The 
multicollinearity would not necessarily have any adverse effect and can be ignored. For 
Research Question 2, Tables 5 and 6 show the results of the model. 
Equation 8 
Log (mobile_tel)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulatory regime)it 
+  b3 log (mobile_install)it b4 log (mobile_min)it +b5 log (mobile_sub)it + b6 log 




Table 5  
Model 2 
Variable Estimate Std Error t-value Pr (>|t|) 
Intercept -1.750 6.187 -2.828 0.013413 
Population 4.502** 1.312 3.432 0.004046 
Regulator 9.105 1.441 0.430 0.673534 
Mobile_Install 9.105 1.441 0.632 0.537707 
Mobile_Sub -7.611 4.388 -1.734 0.104812 
Mobile_Min -1.458e+01 8.206 1.776 0.097411 
GDP 1.725** 8.576 2.011 0.063952 
Competition 7.445 3.509 0.212 0.835021 





Model 2 Multicollinearity Test 








Competition     1.309294** 
Note. ** significant 
The residual standard error: 2.032 on 14 degrees of freedom, the adjusted R-squared: 0.98
29, F-statistic: 89.31 on 26 and 14 DF, p-value: 1.313e-11 
It must be noted that the null hypothesis was accepted. For Research Question 3, Tables 7 
and 8 show the results. 
Equation 9 
Log (total_tel)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulator)it +  b3 log 
(fixed_install)it  + b4 log (fixed_sub)it + b5 log (mobile_install)it  + b6 log 
(mobile_min)it +b7 log (mobile_sub)it + b8 log (telecoms investment)it +  b9 log (GDP per 






Variable Estimate Std Error t-value Pr (>|t|) 
Intercept 2.956 1.124 2.631 0.02514 
Population 9.827** 1.573 6.249 9.52 
Regulator -8.534 1.996 -0.428 0.67798 
Fixed Install Price -9.601** 1.209 -7.943 1.25 
Mobile_Install -7.482** 1.015 -7.371 2.39 
Mobile_subs 1.308** 3.816 3.427 0.00647 
Mobile_min 1.109 6.834 1.623 0.13558 
Total_Invest 6.547 1.474 0.444 0.66641 
GDP 3.347 8.625 .388 0.70608 
Competition 2.024 2.900 .698 0.50107 






Model 3 Multicollinearity Test 
Variable         VIF 
Population    5.090** 
Regulator      2.081 
Fixed_Install  2.415 
Fixed_Sub    7.312** 
Mobile_Install 1.228 
Mobile_Sub  1.043 
Mobile_Min  4.375 
Total_Invest 7.506** 
GDP          2.581 
Competition      2.768 
Note. ** significant 
The residual standard error: 11510 on 10 degrees of freedom, Adjusted R-squared: 0.9976 
F-statistic: 573.7 on 28 and 10 DF, p-value: 7.93e-13 
It must be noted that the null hypothesis must be accepted.  






Log (prices in the telecoms sector)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 
(regulatory regime)it +  b3 log (infrastructure deployment i.e. composite variable)it + b4 
log (telecoms investment)it +  b5 log (income per capita)it + b6 (competition)it  + ε4a.  
This model created a new price variable that was intended to broadly represent 




Variable Estimate Std Error t-value Pr (>|t|) 
Intercept 2.380 6.777 3.512 0.001166 
Population 6.364 9.445 0.674 0.504501 
Regulator 3.826** 1.399 2.736 0.009408 
Mobile_Tel -2.151** 5.064 -4.247 0.000135 
Fixed_Tel -7.404** 1.658 -4.466 6.92 
Total_invest -2.037 7.299 -0.279 0.7817 
GDP 1.582** 7.202 2.196 0.034265 
Competition 4.545** 1.617 2.811 0.007764 






Model 4a Multicollinearity Test 
Variable         VIF 
Population    9.900** 
Regulator     7.148** 
Mobile_Tel   3.817 
Fixed_Tel     8.359** 
Total_Invest 9.001** 
GDP        7.142** 
Competition   7.476** 
Note. ** significant 
 
The residual standard error: 2.182 on 38 degrees of freedom, adjusted R-squared:  0.9978 







8 Model 4b 
Variable Estimate Std Error t-value Pr (>|t|) 
Intercept -1.459 6.695 -2.179 0.03545 
Population 1.826 1.241 1.471 0.1494 
Regulator 1.564 1.783 0.877 0.38575 
Mobile_Tel -6.542 3.452 -1.895 0.06549 
Fixed_Tel -1.451 1.894 -0.766 0.44833 
Total_invest -8.2392 1.046 -0.788 0.43574 
GDP 1.784** 7.65 2.332 0.02495 
Competition 3.265 1.736 1.881 0.06749 






9 Model 4b Multicollinearity Test 
Variable         VIF 
Population 1.309110 
Regulator  9.109** 
Mobile_Tel    3.989 
Fixed_Tel      7.484** 
Total_Invest  1.343 
GDP        8.150** 
Competition     7.994** 
Note. ** significant 
 
The residual standard error: 0.2506 on 39 degrees of freedom, adjusted R-squared:  0.908
5, F-statistic: 22 on 35 and 39 DF, p-value: < 2.2e-16 
The null hypothesis must be accepted. 
For Research Question 5, Tables 12 and 13 show the results. 
Equation 11 
Log (telecoms investment)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulatory 
regime)it +  b3 log (tariffs)it + b4 log (infrastructure deployment i.e. composite variable)it +  






 10 Model 5 
Variable Estimate Std Error t-value Pr (>|t|) 
Intercept 2.272 1.689 1.345 0.2016 
Population 3.631 3.135 1.158 0.2676 
Regulator 3.300 2.853 1.157 0.2682 
Fixed Price 3.946 2.828 1.396 0.1862 
Mobile_Price -1.349** 5.346 -2.523 0.0255 
Total_subs -1.740 9.741 -1.786 0.0974 
GDP 1.335 3.175 1.118 0.2386 
Competition 3.552 3.175 -0.588 0.5665 
Note. Durbin-Watson Test Statistic = 0.70479, P-Value <0.0001, ** significant 
 Table 13 
11 Model 5 Multicollinearity Test 
Variable         VIF 
Population   9.409** 
Regulator     5.877** 
Fixed_Price   4.663** 
Total_Sub 1.809 
GDP      4.113** 
Competition  6.536** 
Note. ** significant 
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From the model the residual standard error is 0.2607 on 13 degrees of freedom. 
The adjusted R-square is .9436 and the F-statistic is 26.42 with the p-value 1.482e-07.  
The null hypothesis must be accepted. 
For Research Question 6, Tables 14 and 15 show the results. 
Equation 12 
Log (Broadband usage)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulatory 
regime)it +  b3 log (tariffs)it + b4 log (telecoms investment)it +  b5 log (income per capita)it 
+ b6 (competition)it+b7 log (infrastructure deployment i.e. composite variable)it + ε 
 Table 14 
 12 Model 6 
Variable Estimate Std Error t-value Pr (>|t|) 
Intercept -3.134 1.196 -2.621 0.03062 
Population -8.599 1.716 -0.501 0.62976 
Regulator -1.623 3.238 -0.501 0.62971 
Fixed Price 2.090** 4.657 4.488 0.00204 
Mobile_Price 4.410 8.562 0.515 0.62045 
Total_Invest 1.990 2.696 0.738 0.48156 
GDP 1.474 1.439 1.025 0.33556 
Competition -4.176 3.617 -1.155 0.28152 






13 Model 6 Multicollinearity Test 
Variable         VIF 
Population   7.316353 
Regulator   5.096912 
Fixed_Price   2.043038 
Total_Invest 1.228998 
GDP    5.329163 
Competition    7.136291 
** significant 
From the model, the residual standard error is 2.386 on 8 degrees of freedom. The 
adjusted R-square is .9801 and the F-statistic is 66.53 with the p-value 8.069e-07.  
For Research Question 7, Tables 16 and 17 show the results. 
Equation 13 
Log (competition)it = b0 constant + b1 log (population)it + b2 (regulatory regime)it 
+  b3 log (tariffs)it + b4 log (infrastructure deployment i.e. composite variable)it +  b5 log 
(income per capita)it + b6log (telecoms investment)it  + ε 
This model regression was a deviation from the standard pooled time series 
model, which was used to assess the other independent variables. The type of regression 
being done was a logistic regression. The reason for this deviation was that the dependent 
variable competition was a binary variable. It was 0 when no competition was within the 
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14 Model 7 
Variable Estimate Std Error Z value Pr ( > |z| ) 
Intercept 8.643 2.17 0 1 
Population 1.351 3.83 0 1 
Regulator -5.773 3.60 0 1 
Fixed_Price -7.415 3.50 0 1 
Mobile_Price 5.908 7.09 0 1 
Total_Invest 3.683 3.08 0 1 
GDP -7.170 2.26 0 1 
Note. Durbin-Watson Test Statistic = 0.25991, P-Value <0.0001, ** significant 
Table 17 













From the R output presented above, the call function indicated the options 
specified while running the model in R. The distribution of the deviance residuals was 
also summarized to have minimum value of -0.00000613 and maximum value of 
0.00000681 individual cases used in the model. 
The subsequent table summarizes the coefficient and test of significance which 
made use of the standard errors, the z-statistic and associated p-values. 
From the model, it can be observed that all of the parameters under study (IR, 
population, telecommunication prices, telecoms investment, and GDP/income per capita) 
have significant effect on competition in telecommunication studies. The logistic 
regression coefficients estimated the change in log odds of the outcome variable 
competition in telecommunication industry for a one unit increase in any of the predictor 
variables. Due to the insignificance of the model parameters, the model was considered to 
be invalid when predicting relationship between competition in telecommunication sector 
and IR, population, telecommunication prices, telecoms investment, and GDP. 
Summary 
 The research results were mixed for the relationship between various aspects of 
the telecoms sector within the Caribbean and the IR. I found that the regulator was 
influential in the amount of subscribers for fixed lines, but that did not hold true for 
cellular subscribers or even for overall subscribers (that is the sum of fixed and cellular 
subscribers). I found that the regulator plays a role in prices for fixed services, but not for 
cellular service. Additionally, both broadband usage and Telecoms investment did not 
seem to be affected by any role played by the regulator. As for competition in the 
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telecoms sector, there did appear to be a relationship between competition and the 
regulator, but that relationship may be as per the design of the variables, hence difficult to 
interpret. Both the regulator and competition were setup as two dummy variables.  
In Chapter 5, I will address a discussion and interpretation of these research 
findings. Finally, the limitations to the research, along with recommendations for possible 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to determine if the English-speaking 
Caribbean has same telecommunications regulatory institutions as larger countries. I used 
a cross-sectional, time series analysis to see whether independent variables, especially 
that of the IR, were related to the dependent variables in the telecoms sector, such as 
prices, growth and investment in the sector, and competition. I found that there was no 
relationship between the IR and mobile growth, telecoms investment, broadband growth, 
and competition. I will provide an interpretation of these research findings. Additionally, 
consideration will be given to the implications of the research for positive social changes 
and suggestions and recommendations made for action and continued research. 
Interpretation of Findings 
 The findings of the quantitative research project extended the knowledge in the 
discipline of telecommunications regulation in the small English-speaking countries of 
the Caribbean. I demonstrated that there were no relationships existing in which 
regulators typically have control in larger developed countries. As was pointed out by 
Reynolds (2014),  
having de facto independent bodies to oversee mergers, licences, and spectrum 
management, does not assure regulatory independence. Jamaica’s legislation still 
empowers the Minister to make decisions regarding licence approval, a process 
which does not allow for the standard of regulatory independence. (p. 11)  
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The systems of government and regulatory institutions in Jamaica are similar if not the 
same as the other English-speaking Caribbean countries as they are based on the 
Commonwealth legal system. The minister or the political directorate are the ones who 
generally direct the regulatory institutions. 
 Regulatory capture may not be the only reason why the IR variable was 
insignificant in several questions such as mobile infrastructure, telecoms investment, and 
telecoms pricing. From a legislative standpoint, the telecommunications IRs in the 
English-speaking Caribbean make them susceptible to regulatory capture. Although 
capture is rarely associated with governments, it does occur. Mitnick (2011) identified 
this as relational capture. However, the other two types of capture that could occur in 
these developing countries are individual and functional capture. Even the most perceived 
independent of the telecommunications regulators in the Caribbean (i.e., the Office of 
Utility Regulation) has recently been restructured to accommodate the thinking of the 
government by creating the equivalent of a board. The other major regulatory body that is 
the ECTEL has two boards that it reports to. The first level of reporting is the board of 
directors, all whom are appointed by ministers of the respective countries, and the second 
is the Council of Ministers that is another board but this one is made up of the ministers 
(Ectel’s Treaty). 
 SIDs have challenges that are inherent because of their size, as Ofa (2012) pointed 
out. Throughout the English-speaking Caribbean, the majority of the heads of these 
regulatory organizations were previously from the institutions that they now regulate. 
Additionally, because of the size of these small countries, there is a lack of or minimal 
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industry and commerce; hence, professional jobs are not easily obtainable. In the country 
of Guyana, the incumbent operator was refused a rate increase. The incumbent telephone 
operator was refused because the increase was called for during the same year an election 
was called, and the regulator could not afford to be perceived as taking sides either for or 
against the government. After the elections, the same application without any changes 
was resubmitted to the regulatory body, and a major rate increase was granted. 
 Regulatory bodies have a deficiency in terms of their operations. There are 
generally no formal ways to lobby a regulator, and the thinking of many of the regulatory 
institutions is unknown as no formal consultative documents are issued, so that operators 
and consumers can make a determination as to the thinking of the regulator in certain 
matters. Nor is there a formal process for comments to be made by any interested parties 
in the decisions of these regulators. This leaves the regulator open and susceptible to the 
other forms of capture. In Anguilla, the regulator consisted of himself and one support 
staff. The regulatory bodies are evolving, and most try to have at least one engineer, one 
consumer advocate, and the regulator who would be responsible for making the 
regulatory decisions. Additionally, most of the regulators studied have no rules outlining 
ex parte discussions; hence, the lack of transparency can cause capture of the regulator. 
Finally, the socioeconomic structure of the English-speaking Caribbean, which is a small 
population, makes it difficult for varying degrees of capture not to occur. 
Limitations of Study 
The limitations of this study were as discussed in Chapter 1. There are limitations 
when using pooled time series regression analysis. In addition, the use of a fixed effects 
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model that does not allow for the control of variables that changes over time was a 
limitation. I did compensate for any omitted variable bias by measuring for changes that 
may occur across time. If the unobservables are not time invariant, then there still could 
be a problem with omitted variable bias. All of the variance inflation factors indicated a 
high degree of collinearity of the variables; maybe there should be some multicollinearity 
correction, and each of the variables significance should be checked individually. 
Another challenge I had encountered was getting the verifiable data, as some of my 
variables had many missing values. 
Recommendations 
 The research that this project focused on was narrowly defined. I examined only 
the developing countries of the English-speaking Caribbean and the effects of those 
countries that created an independent telecommunications regulatory institution had on 
various aspects of the telecommunications sector. Possible research questions involving 
differing and various parameters were left unanswered. SIDs are rarely studied, as there 
are few resources. However, this allows for numerous research possibilities, of which 
there are several recommendations for consideration here.  
I determined that there must be a difference between small and large and 
developed and developing countries because the literature supported that difference. In 
addition, I also found that a difference existed as to the impact of the telecoms regulatory 
institutions on the telecoms sector. However, there could also still be a difference 
between countries that are considered overseas territories (OTs) such as Anguilla, Turks, 
and Caicos Islands and those that are independent countries such as Jamaica and Trinidad 
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and Tobago. OTs, while generally self-governing, do have a representative of the Queen, 
usually a governor whose responsibility is international affairs and economic issues. 
Telecommunications is considered both an economic issue with some degree of 
international affairs associated with it. Additionally, these OTs are also much smaller in 
population than their independent brethren with Bermuda being the largest at 69,000 and 
Montserrat with just over 5,000. These numbers stand in contrast when compared with 
Jamaica with a population just shy of 3 million persons. 
A possible area of research is an examination of the degree of independence that 
may exist between the regulatory bodies. Those regulatory institutions with more 
independence could be having more of an effect on the telecommunications sector than 
what is being observed in this study. There was a difference between formal 
independence of a regulator that is pursuant to the legislation and a de facto 
independence, the latter being so much more difficult to measure.  
Another potential area of study is in the size and type of regulator to determine if 
there is a difference between those regulatory institutions that are multisector or single 
sector focused. Multisector focused regulators for small developing countries would be 
able to make use of economies of scale and scope. Instead of having an economist 
focused on a single sector, that same person could be used to focus on the electricity and 
water sector. 
Implications for Positive Social Change 
There is the potential of additional economic growth that would result in a 
positive social change with the regulation of the telecommunications sector. As I have 
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shown, the relationship has varying strengths between the independent telecoms regulator 
and the telecoms sector. However, in some areas where in larger countries regulators take 
the lead, the regulators in the small developing countries of the English-speaking 
Caribbean play a minimal role. 
Regulation is generally considered one of the primary development tools for a 
government to employ to extract value from any particular sector. This works in 
conjunction with both policy and sector development. Policy tends to be broad-brush 
national initiatives, while sector development is more practical interventions for that 
sector. Regulation as the tool should be bringing market efficiency and customer 
safeguards. This can be seen in the telecoms regulators (i.e., independent or not) before 
competition was prevalent and their primary duty was to ensure that a monopoly operator 
did not charge monopoly rents. In addition, price regulation telecoms regulators that 
includes management of the spectrum ensures that assignment and allocation is done 
efficiently and fairly. 
In developed countries where telecoms regulators are most independent, they 
have had their decisions legislatively reversed. Positive social change could be a 
discussion to make a demarcation and clarification of where the portfolio responsible 
minister or government powers begin and end, and those of the regulators so that there is 
no blurring of the lines of responsibility. A key is to ensure regulators have autonomy in 
certain areas exclusively; smaller developing countries have different structures and 
should not imposed on to adopt ideas/structures of larger countries, cost of setting up, 
design the regulatory institution to get maximum autonomy in areas designated. 
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Legislation must be clear to minimize any overlap between policy makers and the 
regulators, hence avoiding confusion as to their respective roles. The OUR lawsuit 
brought against the portfolio minister indicated that the minister did overstep his bounds, 
as per the legislation.  
Another area for positive social change is to improve the transparency of 
information that flows between operators, regulators, government (i.e., policy makers) 
and the consumers and or consumer advocates. This includes the regulator being mindful 
of competitive information. Rules governing the flow of information between participants 
in the marketplace would help to limit or minimize even the perception of capture that 
could occur with regulators. 
Conclusion 
Telecoms sector regulation in the English-speaking Caribbean is politically driven 
and is impacted by the policy makers’ perception and external influences of where their 
respective markets should be at any given time. This causes the role of policy and 
regulation to be intertwined. However, although it may be that some degree of capture 
will always exist in the English-speaking countries of the Caribbean because of small 
populations and the socioeconomic make up, it can be constrained. It is important for IRs 
to have credibility; this is especially true in the eyes of external institutions such as the 
World Bank. Evidence-based policies that are tailored to the country will come to 
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